Crucial issues concerning central bank independence

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 99-112

  McCallum, Bennett T ^a,b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Dynamic inconsistency; Inflation bias

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031161360     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00007-X     Document Type: Article

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