Time inconsistency in a model with lags, persistence, and overlapping wage contracts

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 378-396

  Goodhart, Charles A E ^a   Huang, Haizhou ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001278531     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028652     Document Type: Article

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