Optimal monetary policy rules in a rational expectations model of the Phillips curve

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 497-520

  Clark, Peter B ^a   Goodhart, Charles A E ^b   Huang, Haizhou ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

C61; Commitment versus discretion; E52; E58; Optimal monetary policy rules; Phillips curve

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041720888     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(98)00055-5     Document Type: Article

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