Costs of separating budgetary policy from control of inflation: A neglected aspect of central bank independence

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 449-467

  Blake, Andrew P ^a   Weale, Martin ^a  

^a NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009249309     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028656     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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