The new UK monetary arrangements: A view from the literature

Economic Journal

Volumn 108, Issue 451, 1998, Pages 1795-1809

  Bean, Charles ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000997649     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00375     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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