Central bank independence - Conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 307-334

  Forder, James ^a  

^a BALLIOL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 30344448334     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028649     Document Type: Article

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