Stackelberg scheduling strategies

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 332-350

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a,b  

^a School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Scheduling; Selfish routing; Stackelberg equilibria

Indexed keywords

MACHINE LOADS; NONCOOPERATIVE USERS; SELFISH ROUTING; STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; FUNCTIONS; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 2342507710     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/S0097539701397059     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. E. ANSHELEVICH, A. DASGUPTA, É. TARDOS, AND T. WEXLER, Near-optimal network design with selfish agents, in Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2003, ACM Press, New York, pp. 511-520.
2. A. ARCHER AND É. TARDOS, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents, in Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, 2001, pp. 482-491.
3. A. BAGCHI, Stackelberg Differential Games in Economic Models, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1984.
4. T. BAŞAR AND G. J. OLSDER, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, SIAM, Philadelphia, 1999.
5. M. BECKMANN, C. B. McGUIRE, AND C. B. WINSTEN, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1956.
6. K.P. BIRMAN, Building Secure and Reliable Network Applications, Manning, Greenwich, CT, 1996.
7. B. BRADEN, D. CLARK, J. CROWCROFT, B. DAVIE, S. DEERING, D. ESTRIN, S. FLOYD, V. JACOBSON, G. MINSHALL, C. PARTRIDGE, L. PETERSON, K. RAMAKRISHNAN, S. J. SHENKER, J. WROCLAWSKI, AND L. ZHANG, Recommendations on Queue Management and Congestion Avoidance in the Internet, Network Working Group Request for Comments 2309, 1998; available online from http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2309. html.
8. R. COCCHI, S. J. SHENKER, D. ESTRIN, AND L. ZHANG, Pricing in computer networks: Motivation, formulation, and example, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 1 (1993), pp. 614-627.
9. R. COLE, Y. DODIS, AND T. ROUGHGARDEN, How much can taxes help selfish routing?, in Proceedings of the Fourth Annual ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, ACM Press, New York, 2003, pp. 98-107.
10. R. COLE, Y. DODIS, AND T. ROUGHGARDEN, Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users, in Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2003, ACM Press, New York, pp. 521-530.
11. A. CZUMAJ, P. KRYSTA, AND B. VÖCKING, Selfish traffic allocation for server farms, in Proceedings of the 34th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, ACM Press, New York, 2002, pp. 287-296.
12. A. CZUMAJ AND B. VOECKING, Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria, in Proceedings of the 13th Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, ACM Press, New York, 2002, pp. 413-420.
13. S. C. DAFERMOS AND F. T. SPARROW, The traffic assignment problem for a general network, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards Sect. B, 73 (1969), pp. 91-118.
14. C. DOULIGERIS AND R. MAZUMDAR, Multilevel flow control of queues, in Proceedings of the Johns Hopkins Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1989, p. 21.
15. C. DOULIGERIS AND R. MAZUMDAR, A game theoretic perspective to flow control in telecommunication networks, J. Franklin Inst., 329 (1992), pp. 383-402.
16. P. DUBEY, Inefficiency of Nash equilibria, Math. Oper. Res., 11 (1986), pp. 1-8.
17. N. G. DUFFIELD, P. GOYAL, A. G. GREENBERG, P. P. MISHRA. K. RAMAKRISHNAN, AND J. E. VAN DER MERWE, A flexible model for resource management in virtual private networks, in Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, Comput. Commun. Rev. 29, ACM Press, New York, 1999, pp. 95-108.
18. A. A. ECONOMIDES AND J. A. SILVESTER, Priority load sharing: An approach using Stackelberg games, in Proceedings of the 28th Annual Allerton Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing, 1990. pp. 674-683.
19. J. FEIGENBAUM, C. H. PAPADIMITRIOU, AND S. J. SHENKER, Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions, J. Comput. System Sci., 63 (2001), pp. 21-41.
20. J. A. FINGERHUT, S. SURI, AND J. S. TURNER, Designing least-cost nonblocking broadband networks, J. Algorithms, 24 (1997), pp. 287-309.
21. M. R. GAREY AND D. S. JOHNSON, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA, 1979.
22. A. GUPTA, A. KUMAR, J. KLEINBERG, R. RASTOGI, AND B. YENER, Provisioning a virtual private network: A network design problem for multicommodity flow, in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, ACM Press, New York, 2001, pp. 389-398.
23. L. A. HALL, Approximation algorithms for scheduling, in Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems, D. S. Hochbaum, ed., PWS, Boston, MA, 1997, ch. 1, pp. 1-45.
24. R. JOHARI AND J. N. TSITSIKLIS, Network Resource Allocation and a Congestion Came, manuscript, 2003.
25. R. M. KARP, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, R. E. Miller and J. W. Thatcher, eds., Plenum Press, New York, 1972, pp. 85-103.
26. Y. A. KORILIS, A. A. LAZAR, AND A. ORDA, Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 5 (1997), pp. 161-173.
27. Y. A. KORILIS, A. A. LAZAR, AND A. ORDA, Capacity allocation under noncooperative routing, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control, 42 (1997), pp. 309-325.
28. Y. A. KORILIS, A. A. LAZAR, AND A. ORDA, Avoiding the Braess paradox in noncooperative networks, J. Appl. Probab., 36 (1999), pp. 211-222.
29. E. KOUTSOUPIAS, M. MAVRONICOLAS, AND P. SPIRAKIS, Approximate equilibria and ball fusion, in Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity, Carleton Scientific, Waterloo, Canada, 2002, pp. 223-235.
30. E. KOUTSOUPIAS AND C. PAPADIMITRIOU, Worst-case equilibria, in Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999, pp. 404-413.
31. D. C. KOZEN, Design and Analysis of Algorithms, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1992.
32. V. S. A. KUMAR AND M. V. MARATHE, Improved results for Stackelberg scheduling strategies, in 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2002, pp. 776-787.
33. A. MAS-COLELL, M. D. WHINSTON, AND J. R. GREEN, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
34. M. MAVRONICOLAS AND P. SPIRAKIS, The price of selfish routing, in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, ACM Press, New York, 2001, pp. 510-519.
35. N. NISAN, Algorithms for selfish agents: Mechanism design for distributed computation, in Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999, pp. 1-15.
36. N. NISAN AND A. RONEN, Algorithmic mechanism design, Games Econ. Behav., 35 (2001), pp. 166-196.
37. A. ORDA, R. ROM, AND N. SHIMKIN, Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 1 (1993), pp. 510-521.
38. G. OWEN, Game Theory, 3rd ed., Academic Press, New York, 1995.
39. A. L. PERESSINI, F. E. SULLIVAN, AND J. J. UHL, The Mathematics of Nonlinear Programming, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1988.
40. C. REVELLE AND D. SERRA, The maximum capture problem including relocation, INFOR, 29 (1991), pp. 130-138.
41. A. RONEN, Solving Optimization Problems among Selfish Agents, Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000.
42. T. ROUGHGARDEN, Designing networks for selfish users is hard, in Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, 2001, pp. 472-481.
43. T. ROUGHGARDEN, The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology, J. Comput. System Sci., 67 (2003), pp. 341-364.
44. T. ROUGHGARDEN, Selfish Routing, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 2002.
45. T. ROUGHGARDEN AND E. TARDOS, How bad is selfish routing?, J. ACM, 49 (2002), pp. 236-259.
46. A. S. SCHULZ AND N. S. MOSES, On the performance of user equilibria in traffic networks, in Proceedings of the 14th Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, ACM Press, New York, 2003, pp. 86-87.
47. Y. SHEFFI, Urban Transportation Networks: Equilibrium Analysis with Mathematical Programming Methods, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985.
48. S. J. SHENKER, Making greed work in networks: A game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 3 (1995), pp. 819-831.
49. H. VON STACKELBERG, Marktform und Gleichgewicht, Springer-Verlag, Wein, 1934; English translation, The Theory of the Market Economy, published in 1952 by Oxford University Press.
50. H. VON STACKELBERG, Marktform und Gleichgewicht, Springer-Verlag, Wein, 1934; English translation, The Theory of the Market Economy, published in 1952 by Oxford University Press.