Avoiding the braess paradox in non-cooperative networks

Journal of Applied Probability

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 211-222

  Korilis, Yannis A ^a   Lazar, Aurel A ^b   Orda, Ariel ^c  

^a LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^c TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Braess Paradox; Computer communication networks; Non cooperative games; Routeing

Indexed keywords

EID: 85037920921     PISSN: 00219002     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1239/jap/1032374242     Document Type: Article

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