Near-optimal network design with selfish agents

Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 511-520

  Anshelevich, Elliot ^a   Tardos, Eva ^a   Dasgupta, Anirban ^a   Wexler, Tom ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Network design; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIALS;

NETWORK DESIGN;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 0037770004     PISSN: 07349025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/780542.780617     Document Type: Conference Paper

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