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Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 91-133

The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union: A review of recent literature

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EID: 19944374012     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511492389.006     Document Type: Chapter
Times cited : (44)

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