Government size and automatic stabilizers: International and intranational evidence

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 3-28

  Fatás, Antonio ^a   Mihov, Ilian ^a  

^a INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Automatic stabilizers; Business cycles; Government size; Intranational economics

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON; POLITICAL ECONOMY; SIZE EFFECT;

EID: 0034800825     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00093-9     Document Type: Article

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