Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 4-6, 2001, Pages 977-987

  Dixit, Avinash ^a   Lambertini, Luisa ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Monetary union

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC PLANNING; FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION;

EID: 0035018351     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00134-9     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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