Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets

European Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 517-539

  Jensen, Henrik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Monetary institutions; Monetary policy cooperation; Performance contracts; Policy targets

Indexed keywords

MONETARY POLICY; POLICY MAKING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034026037     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5     Document Type: Article

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