Is there a tragedy of a common central bank? A dynamic analysis

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 21, Issue 2-3, 1997, Pages 417-447

  Van Aarle, Bas ^a   Lans Bovenberg, A ^a,b   Raith, Matthias G ^c  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS   (Netherlands)

^c BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Dynamic games; European central bank; Policy coordination

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031065903     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(96)00939-6     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Hardin, G., 1968, The tragedy of the commons, Science 162, 1243-1248.
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5. Levine, P. and A. Brochiner, 1994, Fiscal policy coordination and EMU: A dynamic game approach, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 699-729.
6. Levine, P. and J. Pearlman, 1992, Fiscal and monetary policy under EMU: Credible inflation targets or unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, CEPR discussion paper 701.
7. McMillan, J., 1986, Game theory in international economics (Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur).
8. Pindyck, R.S., 1977, Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 22, 517-530.
9. Sargent, T.J. and N. Wallace, 1981, Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5, 1-17.
10. Tabellini, G., 1986, Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 10, 427-442.