Fiscal rules in a monetary union: A short-run analysis

Open Economies Review

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 323-358

  Debrun, X ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; European monetary union; Stability pact

Indexed keywords

FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY UNION; POLICY STRATEGY; PRICE DYNAMICS;

EUROPE;

EID: 0033665652     PISSN: 09237992     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008322425779     Document Type: Article

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