Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 239-258

  Beetsma, Roel M W J ^a   Lans Bovenberg, A ^b  

^a Ministry of Economic Affairs Netherlands   (Netherlands)

^b CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Central bank conservatism; Common central bank; Discipline; E52; E58; E61; E62; F42; Fiscal coordination; Fiscal leadership; Inflation (targets); Monetary union; Optimal institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000587873     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00031-2     Document Type: Article

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