Designing fiscal institutions in a monetary union

Open Economies Review

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 163-179

  Godbillon, B ^a   Sidiropoulos, M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

Author keywords

Federalism; Monetary union; Policy mix

Indexed keywords

EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION; FISCAL POLICY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION;

EUROPE;

EID: 0035038254     PISSN: 09237992     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008332429778     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies
2. Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world
3. Central bank independence and public debt policy
4. Central banking as a political principal-agent problem
5. Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers
6. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
7. Monetary and fiscal policy in a European monetary union: Some public choice considerations
8. National budget processes and fiscal performance
9. Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions
10. Monetary policy games and central bank politics
11. Central-bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term lengths
12. Economic policy coordination in EMU: Strategies and institutions