Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 235-247

  Dixit, Avinash ^a   Lambertini, Luisa ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Monetary union

Indexed keywords

FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0038528590     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00048-X     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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