Social norms and moral hazard

Economic Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 473, 2001, Pages 506-525

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a   Lundholm, Michael ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

THEORETICAL STUDY; UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 0034909609     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00648     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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