Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 274-308

  Sorin, Sylvain ^a,b  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037609397     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0722     Document Type: Article

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