Reputation with observed actions

Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 407-419

  Celentani, Marco ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030527039     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213658     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Al-Najjar, N.: Reputation, product quality and warranties. Université du Quebec à Montréal, mimeo, 1993
2. Aoyagi, M.: Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infintely repeated games. University of Pittsburgh, mimeo, 1994a
3. Aoyagi, M.: Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership with long and stochastically finite-lived players. University of Pittsburgh, mimeo, 1994b
4. Celentani, M., Fudenberg D., Levine D. K., Pesendorfer W.: Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent. Econometrica, forthcoming
5. Klein, B., Leffler K. B.: The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. J. Polit. Econ. 89, 615-641 (1981)
6. Fudenberg, D., Kreps D., Levine D. K.: On the robustness of equilibrium refinements. J. Econ. Theory 44, 354-380 (1988)
7. Fudenberg, D., Levine D. K.: Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a single patient player. Econometrica 57, 759-778 (1989)
8. Fudenberg, D., Levine D. K.: Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59, 561-579 (1992)
9. Kreps, D., Wilson R.: Reputation and imperfect information. J. Econ. Theory 27, 253-279 (1982)
10. Milgrom, P., Roberts J.: Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. J. Econ. Theory 27, 280-312 (1982)