Repeated large games with incomplete information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 116-134

  Lehrer, Ehud ^a,b   Smorodinsky, Rann ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030669340     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0522     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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