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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 82-109
Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 0030188422     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0060     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)
References (17)
  • 1
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  • 2
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  • 3
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    • Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
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  • 5
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    • The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
    • FUDENBERG, D., AND MASKIN, E. (1986). "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 54, 533-554.
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 6
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    • Rational learning leads to nash equilibrium
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  • 7
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    • Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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  • 8
    • 44149093434 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and imperfect information
    • KREPS, D. M., AND WILSON, R. (1982). "Reputation and Imperfect Information," J. Econ. Theory 27, 253-279.
    • (1982) J. Econ. Theory , vol.27 , pp. 253-279
    • Kreps, D.M.1    Wilson, R.2
  • 9
    • 0000738652 scopus 로고
    • Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
    • MlLGROM, P., AND ROBERTS, J. (1982). "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," J. Econ. Theory 27, 280-312.
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  • 10
    • 0000319051 scopus 로고
    • Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection
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    • Pearce, D.G.1
  • 11
    • 49149148306 scopus 로고
    • Collusive behavior in noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
    • RADNER, R. (1980). "Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives," J. Econ. Theory 22, 136-154.
    • (1980) J. Econ. Theory , vol.22 , pp. 136-154
    • Radner, R.1
  • 12
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    • Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
    • RUBINSTEIN, A. (1979). "Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion," J. Econ. Theory 21, 1-9.
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  • 13
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    • Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interests
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  • 15
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    • A 'reputation' refinement without equilibrium
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  • 16
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    • (1994) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.7 , pp. 260-285
    • Watson, J.1
  • 17
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    • Strategy perturbations in repeated games as rules of thumb
    • WATSON, J. (1994b). "Strategy Perturbations in Repeated Games as Rules of Thumb," UCSD Working Paper 94-20.
    • (1994) UCSD Working Paper 94-20
    • Watson, J.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.