Renaissance of the Individual: Reciprocity, Positive Assortment, and the Puzzle of Human Cooperation

Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 331-352

  Johnson, Dominic D P ^a   Price, Michael E ^b   Takezawa, Masanori ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85144373424     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203888155-28     Document Type: Chapter

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