Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public goods game

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Volumn 27, Issue 12, 2001, Pages 1662-1673

  Kurzban, Robert ^a   McCabe, Kevin ^b   Smith, Vernon L ^b   Wilson, Bart J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035541296     PISSN: 01461672     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/01461672012712009     Document Type: Article

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