Monitoring, reputation, and 'greenbeard' reciprocity in a Shuar work team

Journal of Organizational Behavior

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 201-219

  Price, Michael E ^a,b,c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644625956     PISSN: 08943796     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/job.347     Document Type: Article

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