Experiments

The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 639-665

  Bohnet, Iris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Analytical sociology; Behavioral economics; Collective action; Cooperation; Experimental design; Fairness; Game theoretic experiments; Norm abiding behavior; Social norms; Social order

Indexed keywords

EID: 85061113828     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199215362.013.27     Document Type: Chapter

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