Defusing democracy: Central Bank autonomy and the transition from authoritarian rule

Defusing Democracy: Central Bank Autonomy and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-295

  Boylan, Delia M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85059391840     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (548)

1. Acuña, Carlos H. 1994. Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the Nineties (Or, Why the Future No Longer Is What It Used to Be). In Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, ed. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, 31–74. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
2. Agénor, Pierre-Richard. 1994. Credibility and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries. Journal of Development Economics 45: 1–16.
3. Agüero, Felipe. 1992. The Military and the Limits of Democratization in South America. In Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Don-nell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 153–98. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
4. Aguilar Camín, Hector, and Lorenzo Meyer. 1993. In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
5. Alba Vega, Carlos. 1993a. El Empresariado Mexicano ante el Tratado del Libre Comer-cio en América del Norte. In Liberación Económica y Libre Comercio en América del Norte, ed. Gustavo Vega Cañovas, 213–38. Mexico City, Mexico: El Colegio de México.
6. Alba Vega, Carlos. 1993b. La Microindustria Ante la Liberalización Económica y El Tratado del Libre Comercio. Foro Internacional 33, no. 3: 453–83.
7. Alcocer V, Jorge 1994. Party System and Political Transition in Mexico: A Pragmatic Approach. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 149–58. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
8. Alcocer V, Jorge, and Rodrigo M. Morales. 1991. Mitología y Realidad del Fraude Electoral. Nexos 166: 27–33.
9. Alesina, Alberto. 1988. Macroeconomics and Politics. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
10. Alesina, Alberto. 1994. Political Models of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms. In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, 37–57. Washington, DC: World Bank.
11. Alesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen. 1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review 81:1170–88.
12. Alesina, Alberto, and Roberta Gatti. 1995. Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? American Economic Review 85, no. 2: 196–200.
13. Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
14. Alesina, Alberto, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1988. Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the U.S, 1948–84. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 20:63–82.
15. Alesina, Alberto, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1993. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money and Banking 25: 151–62.
16. Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt. Review of Economic Studies 57:403–14.
17. Altimir, Oscar. 1995. Distributive Implications of Adjustment and Economic Reforms in Latin America. Paper presented at the Conference on Development Strategy after Neoliberal Economic Restructuring in Latin America, March 24–25, North-South Center, University of Miami, Miami, FL.
18. Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. 1991. Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance. American Political Science Review 55:539–56.
19. Ames, Barry. 1987. Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
20. ANC (African National Congress). 1990. Recommendations on Post-Apartheid Economic Policy. Proceedings of a workshop, April 28–May 1, Harare, South Africa.
21. Angell, Alan, and Benny Pollack. 1990. The Chilean Elections of 1989 and the Politics of Transition to Democracy. Bulletin of Latin American Research 9, no. 1:1–23.
22. Arrellano, José Pablo. 1988. Crisis y Recuperación Económica en Chile en los Años 80. Colección Estudios Cieplan 24: 63–84.
23. Arrellano, José Pablo. 1989. Comentarios al Proyecto de Ley del Banco Central. Cuadernos de Economía 26, no. 77: 91–96.
24. Arriagada, Genaro. 1985. La Política Militar de Pinochet. Santiago, Chile: Salesianos.
25. Arriagada, Genaro, and Carol Graham. 1994. Chile: Sustaining Adjustment during Transition. In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Stephen B. Webb, 242–86. Washington, DC: World Bank.
26. Arthur, W. B. 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events. Economic Journal 99: 116–31.
27. Aspe, Pedro. 1993. Iniciativa de Reforma Constitucional para Dotar de Autonomía al Banco de México. Address to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, May 24. Typescript.
28. Aspe, Pedro. 1990. Programa de Gobierno de la Concertación. Santiago, Chile: Fundación Aylwin.
29. Bade, Robin, and Michael Parkin. 1980. Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario.
30. Baer, M. Delal. 1993. Mexico’s Second Revolution: Pathways to Liberalization. In Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? ed. Riordan Roett, 51–68. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
31. Balcerowicz, Lesnek. 1995. Understanding Post-communist Transitions. In Economic Reform and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 86–100. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
32. Baldez, Lisa, and John M. Carey. Forthcoming. Pinochet’s Constitution and Executive Agenda Control: Budgetmaking in Chile. In The Structure of Fiscal and Regulatory Policy, ed. Stephan Haggard and Matthew D. McCubbins. Washington, DC: World Bank.
33. Ball, L. 1994. What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? In Monetary Policy, ed. N. G. Mankiw, 155–82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
34. Ball, L, N. G. Mankiw, and D. Romer. 1988. The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-Inflation Trade-off. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:1–65.
35. Banco de México. 1990. Ley del Banco de México.
36. Banco de México. 1993. Ley del Banco de México.
37. Banco de México. 1994. The Mexican Economy. Mexico City, Mexico: Banco de México.
38. Banco de México. 1995. The Mexican Economy. Mexico City, Mexico: Banco de México.
39. Banian, King, Leroy O. Laney, and Thomas D. Willet. 1986. Central Bank Independence: An International Comparison. In Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy, ed. Eugenia Toma and Mark Toma, 199–218. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
40. Barro, Robert, and D. Gordon. 1983a. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101–22.
41. Barro, Robert, and D. Gordon. 1983b. A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy 91:589–610.
42. Bartell, Ernest. 1992. Business Perceptions and the Transition to Democracy in Chile. Working paper 184, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, December.
43. Basañez, Miguel. 1991. Encuesta Electoral 1991. Este País 5: 3–6.
44. Basañez, Miguel. 1993. Is Mexico Headed Toward its Fifth Crisis? In Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? ed. Riordan Roett, 95–115. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
45. Batarce, Jaime A. 1993. Los Efectos de la Deuda Subordinada y la Solución de Mercado. Serie Documentos de Trabajo 201, Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago, Chile, October.
46. Bates, Robert H. 1991. The Economics of Transitions to Democracy. PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 1: 24–27.
47. Bates, Robert H. 1994. Comments. In The Political Economy of Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson, 29–34. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
48. Bates, Robert H. et al. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
49. Bates, Robert H, and Anne O. Kreuger. 1993. Generalizations Arising from the Country Studies. In Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform, ed. Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, 444–72. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
50. Bawn, Kathleen. 1997. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12:101–26.
51. Bazdresch, Carlos, and Santiago Levy. 1991. Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970–1982. In The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastián Edwards, 223–62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
52. Beck, Nathaniel. 1982. Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s. American Journal of Political Science 26: 415–45.
53. Bernanke, Ben, and Alan Blinder. 1992. The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission. American Economic Review 82, no. 4:901–21.
54. Bernhard, William T. 1998. A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. American Political Science Review 92, no. 2: 311–27.
55. Bizberg, Ilán. 1996. Restructuración Productiva y Transformación del Modelo de Rela-ciones Industriales: 1988–1994, Foro Internacional 36, nos. 1(2): 80–106.
56. Blackburn, Keith, and John Christenson. 1988. Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 27: 1–45.
57. Bohn, Henning, and Robert Inman. 1996. Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from US States. Working paper 5533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
58. Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. American Political Science Review 93, no. 3: 609–24.
59. Bosworth, Barry P, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Raúl Labán. 1994. The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
60. Botha, P. J. J. 1997. The South African Reserve Bank and the Rate of Interest. South African Journal of Economics 65, no. 4: 532–67.
61. Boylan, Delia M. 1996. Taxation and Transition: The Politics of the 1990 Chilean Tax Reform. Latin American Research Review 31, no. 1:7–31.
62. Boylan, Delia M. 2000. Bureaucratic Delegation in Comparative Perspective: Constitutional Structure and Reform Timing. Paper presented at the Twenty-second International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, March 16–18, Miami, FL.
63. Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos. 1993. Economic Reforms and Economic Growth: Efficiency and Politics in Latin America. In Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach, ed. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Mar-avall, and Adam Przeworski, 15–76. New York: Cambridge University Press.
64. Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos, Jose María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski. 1993. Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.
65. Briones Espinosa, Ramón. 1989. Informe Sobre El Proyecto de Ley Sobre El Banco Central en Trámite en la Junta del Gobierno. Manuscript, Comité de Reformas Políticas de la Concertación, Santiago, Chile.
66. Brophy-Baermann, Michelle. 1994. Economics and Elections: The Mexican Case. Social Science Quarterly 75, no. 1: 125–35.
67. Broz, J. Lawrence. 1998. The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem. International Organization 52, no. 2: 231–68.
68. Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
69. Buendía, Jorge. 1996. Economic Reform, Public Opinion, and Presidential Approval in Mexico, 1988–1993. Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 5: 566–91.
70. Buffie, Edward, and Allen Sangines Krause. 1989. Mexico 1959–1986: From Stabilizing Development to the Debt Crisis. In Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, ed. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 393–552. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
71. Buira, Ariel. 1996. Reflections on the Mexican Crisis of 1994. In Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets after the Mexican Peso Crisis, ed. Guillermo A. Calvo, Morris Goldstein, and Edward Hochreiter, 307–20. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
72. Burki, S. J, and Craig Baxter. 1991. Pakistan under the Military. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
73. Butler, David, and Donald Stokes. 1974. Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice. London: MacMillan.
74. Calderón, Alvaro, and Stephany Griffith-Jones. 1994. Los Flujos de Capital Extranjero en la Economía Chilena: Renovado Acceso y Nuevos Usos. Working paper 37, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile.
75. Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe 1993. Hacia Una Real Autonomía del Banco de México. Quórum: Publicación Mensual del Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas 11, no. 16: 29–36.
76. Callaghy, Thomas M. 1989. Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for Adjustment. In Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Joan M. Nelson, 115–38. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books and the Overseas Development Council.
77. Calvo, Guillermo A. 1995. Varieties of Capital Market Crises. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
78. Calvo, Guillermo A, and Enrique G. Mendoza. 1996. Mexico’s Balance of Payments Crisis: Chronicle of a Death Foretold. Journal of International Economics 41:235–64.
79. Camp, Roderic. 1985. The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System. Latin American Research Review 20, no. 1:97–118.
80. Camp, Roderic. 1989. Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico. New York: Oxford University Press.
81. Camp, Roderic. 1990. Camarillas in Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas Cabinet. Mexican Studies 1: 87–107.
82. Camp, Roderic. 1995. Political Recruitment across Two Centuries: Mexico 1884–1991. Austin: University of Texas Press.
83. Campero, Guillermo. 1988. Los Empresarios Ante la Alternativa Democrática: El Caso de Chile. Proposiciones 16:48–61.
84. Campero, Guillermo. 1991. Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime. In The Struggle for Democracy in Chile: 1982–1990, ed. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, 128–60. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
85. Cárdenas, Cuarhtémoc. 1993. The False Hopes of the Economic Reform. In Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? ed. Riordan Roett, 149–54. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
86. Carr, Barry. 1989. The Left and Its Potential Role in Political Change. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 361–90. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.Mexican Studies.
87. Castañeda, Jorge. 1993. La Utopía Desarmada. Mexico City, Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz/Planeta.
88. Castañeda, Jorge. 1994. Sorpresas Te da la Vida: México 1994. Mexico City, Mexico: Aguilar.
89. Cavallo, Ascanio. 1992. Los Hombres de la Transición. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello.
90. CEAS (Central Economic Advisory Service). 1993. The Key Issues in the Normative Economic Model. Manuscript, Johannesburg, South Africa.
91. Centeno, Miguel Angel. 1994. Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
92. Centeno, Miguel Angel, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1992. The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite. Journal of Latin American Studies 24: 57–85.
93. Central Bank of Chile. 1989. Seminar: Experiences with Central Bank Autonomy. Monetary Studies 11. Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of Chile.
94. Central Bank of Chile. 1990. Constitutional Organic Act of the Central Bank of Chile. Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of Chile.
95. Cheyre, Hernán. 1988. Proyecciones Económicas para el Periodo 1989–1997: Bajo Esce-narios Políticos Alternativos. Estudios Públicos 32: 239–61.
96. Cho, Y. J. 1990. Financial Policy in Korea and Taiwan. In Korean Economic Development, ed. Jene Kwon, 225–44. New York: Greenwood Press.
97. Choi, Byung-Sun. 1993. Financial Policy and Big Business in Korea: The Perils of Financial Regulation. In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, ed. Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, 23–54. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
98. Cieplan. 1982. El Modelo Económico Chileno: Trayectoria de una Crítica. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Aconcagua.
99. Clark, William Roberts. 1994a. Party Structure, Regime Stability, and Governmental Supply of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1–4, New York.
100. Clark, William Roberts. 1994b. Asset Specificity, Collective Action, and the Societal Demand for Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 28–April 1, Washington, DC.
101. Clark, William Roberts, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. Credible Commitments, International Investment Flows, and Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: A Signaling Model. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, San Francisco, CA.
102. Clark, William Roberts, Usha Nair Reichert, Sandra Lynn Lomas, and Kevin L. Parker. 1998. International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies. International Organization 52, no. 1: 87–120.
103. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4: 386–405.
104. Collier, Paul. 1991. Africa’s External Economic Relations: 1960–1990. African Affairs 90:339–56.
105. Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
106. Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. A Nation of Enemies. New York: W. W. Norton.
107. Conybeare, John A. C. 1987. Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press.
108. Coppedge, Michael. 1993. Mexican Democracy: You Can’t Get There from Here. In Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? ed. Riordan Roett, 127–40. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
109. Corbo, Vittorio, and Stanley Fischer. 1994. Lessons from the Chilean Stabilization and Recovery. In The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges, ed. Barry P. Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Raúl Labán, 29–67. Washington, DC: Brook-ings Institution.
110. Cordera, Rolando, and Carlos Tello. 1981. La Disputa por la Nación: Perspectivas y Opciones del Desarrollo. Mexico City, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
111. Cordoba, José. 1994. Mexico. In The Political Economy of Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson, 232–84. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
112. Cornelius, Wayne A. 1994. Mexico’s Delayed Democratization. Foreign Policy 95: 53–71.
113. Cornelius, Wayne A. 1996. Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party Dominant Regime. Monograph Series 41. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
114. Cornelius, Wayne A, and Anne Craig. 1991. The Mexican Political System in Transition. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
115. Cornelius, Wayne A, Anne Craig, and Jonathon Fox. 1994. Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy. U.S.-Mexico Contemporary Perspectives Series. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.Mexican Studies.
116. Cornelius, Wayne A, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Overview: The Dynamics of Political Change in Mexico. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, Monograph Series 30, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 1–54. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexi-can Studies.
117. Correa, Enrique. 1993. La Estrategia Político-Institucional Para la Transición en Chile. Speech at International Seminar on Chilean Democratization in Comparative Perspective, July 20, FLACSO—Programa Chile, Santiago, Chile. Typescript.
118. Cortázar, René. 1990. El Proceso de Cambios y la Concertación Social. In Transición a la Democracia: Marco Político y Económico, ed. Oscar Muñoz, 69–84. Santiago, Chile: Cieplan.
119. Cothran, Dan A. 1994. Carlos Salinas and the Revolutionary Regime. In Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico: The “Perfect Dictatorship”? ed. Dan A. Cothran, 177–207. Westport, CT: Praeger.
120. Cottarel, Carlo, and Curzio Giannini. 1998. Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund. Policy Analysis and Assessment paper 98/12, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
121. Craig, Anne, and Wayne Cornelius. 1995. Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in Mexico. In Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 249–97. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
122. Craske, Nikki. 1996. Dismantling or Retrenchment? Salinas and Corporatism. In Dismantling the Mexican State? ed. Rob Aitken, Nikki Craske, Gareth A. Jones, and David E. Stansfield, 78–91. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
123. Crespo, José Antonio. 1995. Urnas de Pandora: Partidos Politicos y Elecciones en el Gob-ierno de Salinas. Mexico City: Espasa Calpe.
124. Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
125. Cukierman, Alex. 1994. Commitment through Delegation, Political Influence, and Central Bank Independence. In A Framework for Monetary Stability, ed. J. A. H. de Beaufort Wijnholds, Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger, and L. H. Hoogdin, 55–74. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
126. Cukierman, Alex. 1996. The Economics of Central Banking. Working paper 36–96, Sackler Institute for Economic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
127. Cukierman, Alex, Pantelis Kalitzidakis, Lawrence H. Summers, and Steven B. Webb. 1993. Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment, and Real Rate. Carnegie-Rochester Conferences Series on Public Policy 39: 95–140.
128. Cukierman, Alex, Miguel A. Kiguel, and Nissan Liviatan. 1992. How Much to Commit to an Exchange Rate Rule? Balancing Credibility and Flexibility. World Bank Pol icy Research Working Papers on Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth, World Bank, Washington, DC, July.
129. Cukierman, Alex, and Mariano Tomassi. 1998. When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China? American Economic Review 88, no. 1:180–97.
130. Cukierman, Alex, and Stephen B. Webb. 1995. Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence. World Bank Economic Review 9, no. 3:397–423.
131. Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. 1993. Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. World Bank Economic Review 6, no. 3:353–98.
132. David, Paul A. 1988. The Future of Path-Dependent Equilibrium Economics: From the Economics of Technology to the Economics of Almost Everything? Technical Report, Stanford University, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford, CA, August.
133. Davies, Rob, Dan O’Meara, and Sipho Dlamini. 1985. The Struggle for South Africa. London: Zed Books.
134. Debelle, Guy, and Stanley Fischer. 1994. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? In Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, ed. J. Fuhrer, 195–221. Conference Series 38. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
135. de Figuereido, Rui J. 1998. Political Uncertainty and Policy Insulation: Testing the Formal Theory with State Line-Item Veto Adoption. Manuscript, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley.
136. De Haan, Jakob, and Clemens L. J. Siermann. 1994. Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Political Instability. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Groningen.
137. De Haan, Jakob, and Jan-Egbert E. Sturm. 1992. The Case for Central Bank Independence. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 182:305–27.
138. De Haan, Jakob, and Gert Jan Van’t Hag. 1995. Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence. Public Choice 85:335–51.
139. De la Cuadra, Sergio. 1987. Panel Sobre “La Independencia del Banco Central.” Colec-ción Estudios Cieplan 22: 177–91.
140. De la Garza Toledo, Enrique. 1994. The Restructuring of State-Labor Relations in Mexico. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Moli-nar Horcasitas, 195–218. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
141. De Remes la Brely, Alain. 1993. Hegemonía y Clientelismo en el Sistema Electoral Mex-icano. Master’s thesis, Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
142. DeLong, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1992. Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (fourth quarter): 5–30.
143. Dharamdasani, M. D, ed. 1994. Pakistan under Democratic Regime. Varanasi, India: Shalimar Publishing House.
144. Diamond, Larry et al, eds. 1997. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Theories and Perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
145. Díaz, Alberto, and Beatriz Magaloni. 1997. Presidential Agenda Setting under Hegemonic Party Rule: Executive and Legislature in Mexico. Manuscript, Departa mento de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and Cen-tro de Docencia Económica.
146. Domínguez, Jorge I, ed. 1996. Technopols: Ideas and Leaders in Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
147. Dominguez, Jorge I, and James McCann. 1992. Whither the PRI? Explaining Voter Defection in the 1988 Mexican Presidential Elections. Electoral Studies 11, no. 3:207–22.
148. Dominguez, Jorge I, and James McCann. 1996. Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choices. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
149. Donor, Richard. 1992. The Limits of State Strength: Towards an Institutionalist View of Economic Development. World Politics 44: 398–441.
150. Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastián Edwards. 1991. The Macroeconomics of Populism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
151. Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastián Edwards. 1994. Exchange Rate Policy and Trade Strategy. In The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges, ed. Barry P. Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Raúl Labán, 81–103. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
152. Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Steven Marcus. 1991. International Money and Debt. San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth.
153. Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Alejandro Werner. 1994. Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:253–97.
154. Downes, Patrick, and Reza Vaez-Zadeh. 1991. The Evolving Role of Central Banks. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
155. Drake, Paul W. 1990. The Money Doctor in the Andes: The Kemmerer Missions, 1923–1933. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
156. Dresser, Denise. 1991. Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico’s National Solidarity Program. Current Issue Brief Series 3. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
157. Dresser, Denise. 1994a. Embellishment, Empowerment, or Euthanasia of the PRI? Neoliberal-ism and Party Reform in Mexico. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 125–48. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
158. Dresser, Denise. 1994b. Five Scenarios for Mexico. Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3: 57–71.
159. Dresser, Denise. 1997. Falling from the Tightrope: The Political Economy of the Mexican Crisis. In Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crash, ed. Sebastián Edwards and Moisés Naím, 55–80. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
160. Dugan, William E, and Alfredo Rehren. 1990. Impacto del Régimen Político en la Intermediación de Intereses: Instituciones Públicas y Grupos Empresariales en Chile. Política 22–23: 117–36.
161. Dussell Peters, Enrique. 1996. From Export-Oriented to Import-Oriented Industrialization: Changes in Mexico’s Manufacturing Sector, 1988–1994. In Neoliberalism Revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico’s Political Future, ed. Gerardo Otero, 63–83. New York: Westview Press.
162. Edwards, Sebastián. 1990. The Sequencing of Economic Reform: Analytical Issues and Lessons from Latin American Experiences. World Economy 13, no. 1:1–14.
163. Edwards, Sebastián. 1995. Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope. New York: Oxford University Press.
164. Edwards, Sebastián. 1997. Bad Luck or Bad Policies? An Economic Analysis of the Crisis. In Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crisis, ed. Sebastián Edwards and Moisés Naím, 95–124. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
165. Edwards, Sebastián, and Alejandra Cox Edwards. 1991. Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
166. Edwards, Sebastián, and Moisés Naím. 1997. Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crash. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
167. Edwards, Sebastián, and Guido Tabellini. 1991. Explaining Fiscal Deficits and Inflation in Developing Countries. Working paper 3493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
168. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W, and Jakob De Haan. 1996. The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Special Papers in International Finance 19, Department of Economics, International Finance Section, Princeton University, May.
169. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W, and Eric Schaling. 1993. Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence. Center Discussion Paper Series 9325, Tilburg University.
170. Elizondo, Carlos. 1993. The Making of a New Alliance: The Privatization of the Banks in Mexico. Documento de Trabajo 5, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, Mexico City, Mexico.
171. Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloryn. 1994. Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3:697–722.
172. Escobar Toledo, Saúl. 1987. Rifts in the Mexican Power Elite, 1976–1986. In Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico, ed. Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldúa Montoya, 65–88. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
173. Eyzaguirre, Nicolás. 1989. Una Visión Crítica de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central. Manuscript, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile, September.
174. Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani Rodrik. 1991. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty. American Economic Review 81:1146–85.
175. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. 1989. Modificaciones Posibles a la Ley del Banco Central. Manuscript, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile, December.
176. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. 1991. Desarrollo Económico y Equidad en Chile: Herencias y Desafíos en el Retorno a la Democracia. Colección Estudios Cieplan 31: 31–51.
177. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo, Manuel Agosín, and Andras Uthoff. 1995. Capital Movements, Export Strategy, and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Chile. In Coping with Capital Surges: The Return of Finance to Latin America, ed. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffith-Jones, 99–144. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
178. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo, and Oscar Muñoz. 1990. Desarrollo Económico, Inestabilidad y Desequilibrios Políticos en Chile: 1950–1989. Colección Estudios Cieplan 28: 121–56.
179. Figari Oxley, Augustín. 1989. El Banco Central de Chile: Su Autonomía en el Contexto de la Constitución Política de 1980. Master’s thesis, Departamento de Economía, Universidad Católica de Valparaiso, Valparaiso, Chile.
180. Fishlow, Albert, et al. 1994. Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council.
181. Flaño, Nicolás. 1992.On Solid Ground: Chile’s Economy Today. Lecture to the Smithsonian Campus on the Mall, Washington, DC, February.
182. Flisfisch, Angel. 1994. La Gestión Estratégica de un Proceso de Transición y Consoli-dación: El Caso Chileno, Proposiciones 25: 20–33.
183. Fontaine, Juan Andrés. 1989. Banco Central: Autonomía Para Cautelar la Estabilidad. Cuadernos de Economía 26, no. 77: 65–74.
184. Fontaine, Juan Andrés. 1993. Transición Económica y Política en Chile: 1970–1990. Estudios Públicos 50: 229–79.
185. Foxley, Alejandro. 1985. Para una Democracia Estable. Santiago, Chile: Cieplan.
186. Foxley, Alejandro. 1986. The Neoconservative Economic Experiment in Chile. In Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, ed. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valen-zuela, 13–50. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
187. Foxley, Alejandro. 1990. La Política Económica para la Transición. In Transición a la Democracia: Marco Político y Económico, ed. Oscar Muñoz, 101–20. Santiago, Chile: Cieplan.
188. Frank, Voker. 1997. Growth with Equity: A Marriage That Works? Chilean Labor Organizations’ Experience in the New Democracy 1990–1996. Paper presented at the Twentieth International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, April 17–19, Guadalajara, Mexico.
189. Franzese, Robert J. Jr. 1994. Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain. Working paper 56, Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
190. Franzese, Robert J. Jr. 1996. The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Empirical Examination of the OECD Post-War Experience. Chap. 8 in The Political Economy of Over-Commitment: A Comparative Study of Democratic Management of the Keynesian Welfare State. Ph.D. diss, Department of Government, Harvard University.
191. Franzese, Robert J. Jr. 1999. Two Hands on the Wheel: Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3: 681–706.
192. Frei, Eduardo. 1994. Un Gobierno Para Los Nuevos Tiempos: Bases Programáticas del Segundo Gobierno de la Concertación. Santiago, Chile.
193. Frieden, Jeffry. 1991a. Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America: 1965–85. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
194. Frieden, Jeffry. 1991b. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization 45, no. 4: 425–51.
195. Frieden, Jeffry. 1998. The Politics of Exchange Rates. In Mexico, 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging-Market Crash, ed. Sebastián Edwards and Moisés Naím, 81–94. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
196. Frieden, Jeffry, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview. In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner, 25–47. New York: Cambridge University Press.
197. Fry, Maxwell J. 1982. Models of Financially Repressed Developing Economies. World Economy 10, no. 9:731–50.
198. Fry, Maxwell J. 1984. Saving, Financial Intermediation, and Economic Growth in Asia. Asian Development Review 2, no. 1:82–91.
199. Fry, Maxwell J. 1997. Emancipating the Banking System and Developing Markets for Government Debt. New York: Routledge.
200. Fukuyama, Francis. 1991. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
201. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1986. Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 1973–1980. In Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, ed. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, 144–83. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
202. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1989. La Posibilidad Democrática en Chile. Cuadernos de Difusión. Santiago, Chile: FLACSO.
203. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1991. La Redemocratización Política en Chile: Transición, Inauguración, y Evolución. Estudios Públicos 42: 101–33.
204. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1992. El Aprendizaje Político en la Redemocratización Chilena. Documento de Trabajo, Serie Estudios Políticos 24, FLACSO—Programa Chile, Santiago, Chile, November.
205. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1993. La Dimensión Política de los Procesos de Transformación en Chile. Doc-umento de Trabajo, Serie Estudios Políticos 29, FLACSO—Programa Chile, Santiago, Chile, August.
206. Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
207. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. 1996. Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change. In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, 48–75. New York: Cambridge University Press.
208. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market. In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, 173–206. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
209. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1993. Liderazgo Empresarial y Reforma Económica Estructural en México: La Perspectiva del Proceso a Principios de los Noventa. In Ajuste Estructural y Actores Sociales, ed. Enrique de la Garza, 1–38. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Editorial El Cabanito.
210. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994a. New Circuits, Markets, and Actors in the Mexican Financial System. Manuscript, Department of Economics, UAM-Azcapotzalco.
211. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994b. Grupos Privados Nacionales en México, 1987–1993. Revista de la Cepal: 159–75.
212. Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. El Liderazgo de las Grandes Empresas Industriales Mexicanas en los Noventa. In Las Grandes Empresas Privadas Nacionales en América Latina en los Noventa, ed. Celso Garrido and Walker Peres, 1–33. Mexico City, Mexico: UAM-Cepal.
213. Garrido, Luis Javier. 1987. El Partido del Estado Ante la Sucesión Presidencial en Méx-ico, 1929–1987. Revista Mexicana de Sociología 49, no. 3: 59–82.
214. Garrido, Luis Javier. 1989. The Crisis of Presidencialismo. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 417–34. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
215. Geddes, Barbara. 1994a. Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
216. Geddes, Barbara. 1994b. The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Latin American Research Review 30, no. 2:195–214.
217. Geddes, Barbara. 1995. A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe. Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2: 239–74.
218. Geddes, Barbara. 1998. What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3–6, Boston, MA.
219. George, Alexander L. 1982. Case Studies and Theory Development. Paper presented at the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, October 15–16, Carnegie-Mellon University.
220. Giavazzi, Francesco, and Alberto Giovannini. 1989. Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Monetary System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
221. Giavazzi, Francesco, and Marco Pagano. 1994. The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility. In Monetary and Fiscal Policy, ed. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 1:225–46. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
222. Gibson, Edward L. 1997. The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina. World Politics 50, no. 3: 339–70.
223. Gíl Díaz, Francisco, and Augustín Carstens. 1997. Pride and Prejudice: The Economics Profession and Mexico’s Financial Crisis, 1994–95. In Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crash, ed. Sebastián Edwards and Moisés Naím, 165–200. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
224. Giorgio, Luis Alberto. 1997. Banking Distress and Crisis: Lessons from Selected Experiences in Latin America. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
225. Godoy, Oscar. 1994. La Cuestión de la Transición. Revista de Ciencia Política 16, nos. 1–2:11–20.
226. Golob, Stephanie R. 1996. Making Possible What Is Necessary: Pedro Aspe, the Salinas Team, and the Next Mexican Miracle. In Technopols: Ideas, Leaders, and Their Impact on Freeing Politics and Markets, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, 95–144. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
227. Gómez Tagle, Sylvia. 1993. Electoral Reform and the Party system, 1977–90. In Mexico: Dilemmas of Transition, ed. Neil Harvey, 64–90. London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and British Academic Press.
228. Gonzáles Casanova, Pablo, and Aguilar Camín, Hector, eds. 1985. México ante la Crisis: El Contexto Internacional y la Crisis Económica, vol. 1. Mexico City, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
229. González-Gómez, Mauricio. 1998. Crisis and Economic Change in Mexico. In Mexico Under Zedillo, ed. Susan Kaufman Purcell and Luis Rusio, 37–65. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
230. Goodman, John B. 1991. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Comparative Politics 23, no. 2: 329–49.
231. Goodman, John B. 1992. Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
232. Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini. 1991. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy 13: 341–92.
233. Gridle, Merilee. 1996. Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press.
234. Gruben, William, and John Welch. 1996. Distortions and Resolutions in Mexico’s Financial System. In The Changing Structure of Mexico, ed. Laura Randall. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
235. Gruber, Lloyd Gerard. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
236. Habib, Adam. 1998. South Africa: The Politics of Economic Policy-Making. Paper pre sented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3–6, Boston, MA.
237. Haggard, Stephan. 1994. From the Heavy Industry Plan to Stabilization: Macroeco-nomic Policy 1976–1980. In Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970–1990, ed. Stephan Haggard et al, 49–74. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development and Korean Development Institute.
238. Haggard, Stephan, and Susan Collins. 1994. The Political Economy of Adjustment in the 1980s. In Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970–1990, ed. Stephan Haggard et al, 75–110. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development and Korean Development Institute.
239. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1989. Economic Adjustment in New Democracies. In Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Joan M. Nelson, 57–78. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council.
240. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
241. Haggard, Stephan, and Chung H. Lee. 1993. The Political Dimension of Finance in Economic Development. In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, ed. Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, 3–22. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
242. Haggard, Stephan, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1993. Political Explanations of Financial Policy in Developing Countries. In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, ed. Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, 293–326. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
243. Haggard, Stephan, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. Financial Internationalization and the Developing World. International Organization 50, no. 1: 35–68.
244. Haggard, Stephan, and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds. Forthcoming. The Structure of Fiscal and Regulatory Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.
245. Haggard, Stephan, and Stephen B. Webb, eds. 1994. Introduction to Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Stephen B. Webb. Washington, DC: World Bank.
246. Hagopian, Francis. 1990. “Democracy by Undemocratic Means”? Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil Comparative Political Studies 23, no. 2: 147–70.
247. Hagopian, Francis. 1996. Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
248. Hall, Peter A. 1994. Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe. German Politics and Society 31: 1–23.
249. Hall, Peter A, and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. 1998. Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. International Organization 52, no. 3: 505–35.
250. Hall, Peter A, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institu-tionalisms. Political Studies 44, no. 5: 936–57.
251. Hallerberg, Mark, and Jurgen von Hagen. 1997. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union. Working paper 6341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
252. Han, Sung-joo, and Yung Chul Park. 1993. South Korea: Democratization at Last. In Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. James Morley, 163–92. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
253. Hastings, Laura A. 1993. Regulatory Revenge: The Politics of Free-Market Financial Reforms in Chile. In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, ed. Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, 201–29. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
254. Held, David. 1996. Models of Democracy. 2d ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
255. Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions. World Politics 50, no. 2: 203–34.
256. Herbst, Jeffrey. 1997. Prospects for Elite-Driven Democracy in South Africa. Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 4:595–615.
257. Heredia, Blanca. 1992. Mexican Business and the State: The Political Economy of a “Muddled Transition.” Working paper 182, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, October.
258. Heredia, Blanca. 1994. Making Economic Reform Politically Viable. In Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America, ed. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, 265–96. Miami: North-South Center Press.
259. Heredia, Blanca. 1996. State-Business Relations in Contemporary Mexico. In Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas, ed. Mónica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 131–50. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
260. Hernández Rodriguez, Rogelio 1988. Los Hombres del Presidente de la Madrid. Foro Internacional 28, no. 1: 5–38.
261. Heyman, Timothy. 1991. Investing in Mexico: Mexican Economy and Financial Markets. Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Milenio.
262. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467–87.
263. Hojman, David. 1990. Chile after Pinochet: Aylwin’s Christian Democrat Economic Policies for the 1990s. Bulletin of Latin American Research 9, no. 1:25–47.
264. Horn, Murray J, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs. Virginia Law Review 75: 499–508.
265. Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
266. Huber, John, and Charles R. Shipan. 2000. The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transactions Costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1: 25–52.
267. Huneeus, Carlos. 1985. La Política de la Apertura y sus Implicancias para la Inaugu-ración de la Democracia en Chile. Revista de Ciencias Políticas 12, no. 1:25–84.
268. Huneeus, Carlos. 1986. La Inauguración de la Democracia en Chile: Reforma en el Proced-imiento y Ruptura en el Contenido Democrático? Revista de Ciencia Política 8, nos. 1–2:23–87.
269. Huneeus, Carlos. 1988a. La Democracia en Chile: Un Enfoque Institucional. Pensamiento Ibero-Americano 14: 93–108.
270. Huneeus, Carlos. 1988b. El Ejército y la Política en el Chile de Pinochet: Su Magnitud y sus Alcances. Opciones 14:89–136.
271. Huneeus, Carlos. 1994. En Defensa de la Transición: El Primer Gobierno de la Democracia en Chile. Working paper 18, Universität Heidelbert, Institut für Politische Wis-senschaft, Lateinamerikaforschung, December.
272. Huneeus, Carlos, and Jorge Olave. 1987. La Participación de los Militares en los Nuevos Autoritarismos: Chile en Una Perspectiva Comparada. Opciones 11:119–62.
273. Hunter, Wendy. 1997. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
274. Hunter, Wendy, and David S. Brown. 1998. Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1992. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University; and Department of Political Science, Rice University.
275. International Monetary Fund. 1992. Exchange Rate Agreements and Exchange Rate Restrictions. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
276. International Monetary Fund. 1995. Developments in 1994: World Economic Outlook Annex I, Factors behind the Financial Crisis in Mexico. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
277. Iversen, Torben. 1998. Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money. International Organization 52, no. 3: 469–504.
278. Jensen, Michael C. 1983. Organization Theory and Methodology. Accounting Review 8: 319–87.
279. Johnson, David R, and Pierre L. Siklos. 1992. Political Effects on Central Bank Behavior: Some International Evidence. In Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union, ed. P. L. Siklos, 133–64. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press.
280. Jordan, Thomas J. 1997a. Central Bank Independence and the Trade-off between Inflation and Output Stabilization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153:366–83.
281. Jordan, Thomas J. 1997b. Disinflation Costs, Accelerating Inflation Gains, and Central Bank Independence. Weltwritschaftliches Archiv 133, no. 1:1–21.
282. Joubert, W. A. 1976. The Law of South Africa. Vol. 1. Durban: Butterworths.
283. Kane, Edward J. 1980. Politics and Fed Policymaking: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same. Journal of Monetary Economics 6:199–211.
284. Karl, Terry. 1986. Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Vol. 2, Latin America, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead Jr, 196–220. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
285. Karl, Terry. 1990. Dilemmas of Democratization. Comparative Politics 23, no. 1: 1–21.
286. Karl, Terry, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1994. Democratization around the Globe: Its Opportunities and Risks. In World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century’s End, 2d ed, ed. Michael T. Klare and Dan Thomas, 43–62. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
287. Katz, Isaac. 1993. El Nuevo Entorno Económico e Institucional: La Autonomá del Banco de México. Manuscript, Departamento de Economía, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
288. Katzenstein, Peter. 1986. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
289. Kaufman, Robert R, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia. 1994. Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System. In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Stephen B. Webb, 360–410. Washington, DC: World Bank.
290. Kaufman, Robert R, and Leo Zuckerman. 1998. Attitudes toward Economic Reform in Mexico: The Role of Political Mediations. American Political Science Review 92, no. 2: 359–76.
291. Kaufman Purcell, Susan, and Luis Rusio, eds. Mexico under Zedillo. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
292. Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 1998. When Does Delegation Improve Credibility? Central Bank Independence and the Separation of Powers. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3–6, Boston, MA.
293. Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 1999. Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When Are Central Banks Irrelevant? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2–5, Atlanta, GA.
294. Kentridge, Matthew. 1993. Turning the Tanker: The Economic Debate in South Africa. CPS Social Contract Series, Research report 32, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa.
295. Kessler, Timothy P. 1998. Political Capital: Mexican Financial Policy under Salinas. World Politics 51, no. 1: 36–66.
296. Kildegaard, Anne. 1997. Foreign Finance and the Collapse of the Mexican Peso. Journal of Economic Issues 31, no. 4: 951–67.
297. Kim, P. J. 1994. Financial Institutions. In Korea’s Political Economy: An Institutional Perspective, ed. Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, 273–319. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
298. Kim, Yoon Hyung. 1994. An Introduction to the Korean Model of Political Economy. In Korea’s Political Economy: An Institutional Perspective, ed. Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, 45–62. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
299. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Sci-entific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
300. Kinney-Giraldo, Jeanne. 1996. Development and Democracy in Chile: Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley and the Concertación Project for the Nineties. In Technopols: Ideas, Leaders, and Their Impact on Freeing Markets and Politics in Major Latin American Countries in the 1980s and 1990s, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez, 229–75. Pittsburgh: Pennsylvania State University Press.
301. Klesner, Joseph L. 1994. Realignment or Dealignment? Consequences of Economic Crisis and Restructuring for the Mexican Party System. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 159–94. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
302. Klesner, Joseph L. 1995. The 1994 Mexican Elections: Manifestation of a Divided Society? Mexican Studies 11, no. 1: 137–49.
303. Klesner, Joseph L. 1997. Dissolving Hegemony: Electoral Competition and the Decline of Mexico’s One-Party-Dominant Regime. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28–31, Washington, DC.
304. Klesner, Joseph L. 1998. Economic Integration and Regional Electoral Dynamics in Mexico. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Kenyon College.
305. Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.
306. Kong, T. Y. 1997. Democratization and Its Aftermath: Transition and Continuity in South Korea. In The Korean Peninsula in Transition, ed. D. H. Kim and T. Y. Kong, 91–115. Oxford: MacMillan Press.
307. Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics 43, no. 3: 336–66.
308. Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
309. Kreps, David M. 1991. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In Positive Perspectives on Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 90–143. New York: Cambridge University Press.
310. Krugman, Paul. 1995. Emerging Market Blues. Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4: 28–44.
311. Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85:473–92.
312. Lange, Peter, and Geoffrey Garrett. 1985. The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974–1980. Journal of Politics 47:792–827.
313. Larraín, Mauricio. 1989. How the 1981–1983 Chilean Banking Crisis Was Handled. Policy, Planning, and Research Working Papers, World Bank, Washington, DC.
314. Lee, Manwoo. 1990. The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics 1987–1990. New York: Praeger.
315. Lee, Manwoo. 1995. South Korea’s Politics of Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election. In Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young Sam, ed. James Cotton. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
316. Leiderman, Leonardo, and Alfredo E. Thorne. 1996. The 1994 Mexican Crisis and its Emerging Aftermath: What Are the Main Lessons? In Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets after the Mexican Peso Crisis, ed. Guillermo A. Calvo, Morris Goldstein, and Eduard Hochreiter, 1–43. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
317. Levi, Margaret. 1990. A Logic of Institutional Change. In The Limits of Rationality, ed. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, 402–18. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
318. Lijphart, Arend. 1975. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. Comparative Political Studies 9, no. 2: 158–77.
319. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
320. Lindblom, Charles. 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.
321. Linz, Juan J. 1975. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. In Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 187–411. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
322. Linz, Juan J. 1990. Transitions to Democracy. Washington Quarterly 13, no. 3:143–63.
323. Linz, Juan J, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
324. Loeza, Soledad. 1989. The Emergence and Legitimization of the Modern Right, 1970–88, trans. William B. Heller. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
325. Loeza, Soledad. 1994. Political Liberalization and Uncertainty in Mexico. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 105–24. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
326. Lohmann, Susanne. 1992. Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility. American Economic Review 82, no. 1: 273–86.
327. Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. Is Japan Special? Monetary Linkages and Price Stability. Monetary and Economic Studies: 63–79.
328. Lohmann, Susanne. 1998a. Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–1992. World Politics 51, no. 3: 401–46.
329. Lohmann, Susanne. 1998b. Reputational versus Institutional Solutions to the Time Inconsistency Problem in Monetary Policy. In Positive Political Economy: Theory and Evidence, ed. Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and Harry Huizinga, 9–22. New York: Cambridge University Press.
330. Londregan, John. 2000. Faustian Bargains: Legislative Institutions and Chile’s Democratic Transition. Cambridge University Press.
331. Londregan, John, and Keith T. Poole. 1990. Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power. World Politics 42, no. 2: 151–83.
332. Lotter, H. P. P. 1997. Injustice, Violence, and Peace: The Case of South Africa. Atlanta: Rodopi.
333. Lotter, H. P. P. 1993. The Political Left in Chile, 1973–1990. In The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika, ed. Barry Carr and Steve Ellner, 23–40. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
334. Lotter, H. P. P. 1995. The Transition to Civilian Government in Chile, 1990–1994. In The Struggle for Democracy in Chile: 1982–1990, ed. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, 305–37. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
335. Lotter, H. P. P. 1998. When You Wish upon the Stars: Why the Generals (and Admirals) Say Yes to Latin American “Transitions” to Civilian Government. In The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, ed. Paul W. Drake and Matthew D. McCubbins, 115–45. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
336. Luders, Rolf J. 1991. Massive Divestiture and Privatization: Lessons from Chile. Contemporary Policy Issues 9, no. 4: 1–19.
337. Lujambio, Alonso. 1993. Presidentes y Congresos: Estados Unidos, la Experiencia Lati-noamericana, y el Futuro Mexicano. Foro Internacional 33, no. 3: 317–60.
338. Luna, Matilda. 1994. Los Retos de la Globalización: La Reforma Microeconómica. In Los Empresarios Ante la Globalización, ed. Ricardo Tirado, 194–221. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
339. Luna, Matilda. 1995. Entrepreneurial Interests and Political Action in Mexico: Facing the Demands of Economic Modernization. In The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico, ed. Riordan Roett, 194–221. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
340. Luna, Matilda, and Ricardo Tirado. 1992. El Consejo Coordinador Empresarial: Una Radiografía. Proyecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México, Cuaderno 1. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Cien-cias Políticas y Sociales y el Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
341. Luna, Matilda, Ricardo Tirado, and Francisco Valdés Ugalde. 1991. Los Empresarios y La Política en México, 1982–1986. In Las Empresas y Los Empresarios en el México Contemporáneo, ed. Ricardo Pozas and Matilda Luna, 21–87. Mexico City, Mexico: Grijalvo.
342. Lustig, Nora. 1992. Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
343. Lustig, Nora. 1995. The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise. Brookings Papers in International Economics 114. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June.
344. Magaloni, Beatriz. 1998. Electoral Consequences of the Peso Crisis: Last Gasp for the PRI? Paper presented at the 1998 Latin American Studies Convention, September 28–30, Chicago.
345. Mahmood, S, and N. Shaukat. 1995. The Law of Banks. Lahore: Legal Research Centre.
346. Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute with the University of Notre Dame Press.
347. Mansell Carstens, Catherine. 1992. Las Nuevas Finanzas en México. Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Milenio.
348. Mansell Carstens. 1994. The Internationalization of the Mexican Financial System. Paper presented at the Global and Comparative Analysis of Financial Institutions, May 9–13, Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Conference and Study Center, Bellagio, Italy.
349. Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics 45: 406–32.
350. Masciandaro, Donato, and Guido Tabellini. 1988. Monetary Regimes and Fiscal Deficits: A Comparative Analysis. In Monetary Policy in the Pacific Basin Countries, ed. H. Cheng, 125–52. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
351. Mashaw, Jerry. 1990. Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:267–98.
352. Massad, Carlos. 1989. La Función Técnica y la Función Política del Banco Central: Anatomía Prenatal. Cuadernos de Economía 26, no. 77: 75–90.
353. Maxfield, Sylvia. 1993. The Politics of Mexican Financial Policy. In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, ed. Stephan Haggard, Chung E. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, 230–58. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
354. Maxfield, Sylvia. Bankers’ Alliances and Economic Policy Patterns: Evidence from Mexico and Brazil. Comparative Political Studies 23, no. 4: 419–58.
355. Maxfield, Sylvia. 1989. International Economic Opening and Government-Business Relations. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 215–36. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies.
356. Maxfield, Sylvia. 1994. Revenue Imperatives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations. World Politics 46, no. 4: 556–88.
357. Maxfield, Sylvia. 1997. Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
358. Maxfield, Sylvia, and Ricardo Anzaldúa Montoya, eds. 1987. Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
359. McCubbins, Matthew D, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3, no. 2: 243–77.
360. McCubbins, Matthew D, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. Virginia Law Review 75:431–82.
361. McKinnon, Ronald I. 1973. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
362. McKinnon, Ronald I. 1991. The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
363. McRae, Duncan. 1977. A Political Model of the Business Cycle. Journal of Political Economy 85:239–86.
364. Meenai, S. A. 1984. Money and Banking in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
365. Meller, Patricio. 1984. Los Chicago Boys y el Modelo Económico Chileno: 1973–1983. Apuntes Cieplan 43.
366. Meller, Patricio. 1992. La Apertura Comercial Chilena: Lecciones de Política. Colección Estudios Cieplan 35: 9–54.
367. Méndez, Roberto, Oscar Godoy, Enrique Barros, and Arturo Fontaine Talavera. 1989. Por Qué Ganó el No? Estudios Públicos 33: 83–134.
368. MERG (Macroeconomic Research Group). 1993. Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa. Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Development Studies.
369. Michie, Jonathon, and Vishnu Padayachee, eds. 1997. The Political Economy of South Africa’s Transition. London: Dryden Press.
370. Michie, Jonathon, and Vishnu Padayachee, eds. 1995. The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
371. Milgrom, Paul R, Douglas C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics 2, no. 1: 1–22.
372. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
373. Millán, René. 1988. Los Empresarios Mexicanos ante el Estado y la Sociedad. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Siglo Veintiuno/Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
374. Moe, Terry M. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 28:739–77.
375. Moe, Terry M. 1987. Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB. Studies in American Political Development 2:236–39.
376. Moe, Terry M. 1990a. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver E. Williamson, 116–53. New York: Oxford University Press.
377. Moe, Terry M. 1990b. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213–53.
378. Moe, Terry M, and Michael Caldwell. 1994. The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, no. 1:171–95.
379. Molinar Horcasitas, Juan 1989. The Future of the Electoral System. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 265–90. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.Mexican Studies.
380. Molinar Horcasitas, Juan. 1993. El Tiempo de la Legitimidad: Elecciones, Autoritarismo, y Democracia en México. Mexico City, Mexico: Cal y Arena.
381. Molinar Horcasitas, Juan. 1994. Changing the Balance of Power in a Hegemonic Party System. In Institutional Design and Democratization, ed. Arendt Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, 137–60. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
382. Molinar Horcasitas, Juan. 1996. Renegotiating the Rules of the Game: The State and Political Parties. In Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas, ed. Mónica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 25–39. London: Institute for Latin American Studies, University of London.
383. Molinar Horcasitas, Juan, and Jeffrey Weldon. 1994. Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity. In Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Anne Craig, and Jonathon Fox, 123–42. U.S.-Mexico Contemporary Perspectives Series. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
384. Montecinos, Veronica. 1988. Economics and Power: Chilean Economists in Government 1958–1985. Ph.D. diss, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.
385. Montero, Cecilia. 1990. La Evolución del Empresariado Chileno: Surge un Nuevo Actor? Colección Estudios Cieplan 30: 91–122.
386. Montero, Cecilia. 1993. El Actor Empresarial en Transición. Colección Estudios Cieplan 37: 37–68.
387. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. International Organization 45, no. 1: 19–56.
388. Morris, Stephen D. 1992. Political Reformism in Mexico: Salinas at the Brink. Journal of Interamerican Affairs and World Affairs 34, no. 1:27–57.
389. Morris, Stephen D. 1995. Political Reformism in Mexico: An Overview of Contemporary Mexican Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
390. Moulian, Tomás. 1992. El Gobierno Militar: Modernización y Revolución. Documento de Trabajo. Serie Estudios Políticos 23, FLACSO—Programa Chile. Santiago, Chile, November.
391. Moulian, Tomás. 1993. Los Actores Políticos de Gobierno y Oposición: El Caso Chileno. Paper presented at the International Seminar on Chilean Democratization in Comparative Perspective, July 19–21, FLACSO—Programa Chile, Santiago, Chile.
392. Muñoz, Oscar. 1985. Chile: El Colapso de un Experimento Económico y sus Efectos Políticos. Colección Estudios Cieplan 16: 101–22.
393. Muñoz, Oscar. 1992. Economie et Société au Chili: Un Développement Historique Marqué par la Frustration et le Changement. Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales, UNESCO—Paris, November.
394. Murray, Martin. 1994. The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa. New York: Verso.
395. Nacional Financiera, SNC. 1993. Annual Report 1993. Mexico City, Mexico.
396. Natella, Stefano, and Justin Manson. 1991. The Mexican Banking System. New York: First Boston.
397. Nelson, Joan M. 1993. The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe? World Politics 45, no. 3: 433–63.
398. Nelson, Joan M. 1994. Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
399. Nordhaus, William. 1975. The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42:169–90.
400. North, Douglas C, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Journal of Economic History 49: 803–32.
401. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1992. Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes. In Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 17–56. Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute with the University of Notre Dame Press.
402. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
403. Offe, Claus, and Helmut Wiesenthal. 1980. Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form. Political Power and Social Theory 1:67–115.
404. Oks, Daniel, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. 1993. Mexico in the International Financial System. In Mobilizing International Investment for Latin America, ed. Colin Bradford, 203–34. Paris: OECD.
405. O’Meara, Dan. 1996. Forty Years Lost: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party 1948–1990. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
406. Ortega Riquelme, Ernesto 1985. El Pequeño Empresario de la Clase Media. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos.
407. Muñoz, Ernesto, and Ernesto Tironi. 1988. Pobreza en Chile. Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo.
408. Ortiz, Guillermo. 1994. La Reforma Financiera en México. Mexico City, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
409. Ossa, Fernando. 1993a. Políticas de Fomento al Sector Exportador Chileno. In El Mod-elo Económico Chileno, ed. Daniel Wisecarver, 359–400. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica.
410. Ossa, Fernando. 1993b. La Creación del Banco Central de Chile en 1925: Antecedentes Previos y los Primeros Años de Operación. Estudios de Economía 20, no. 1:177–91.
411. Pacheco Méndez, Guadalupe P. 1997. Un Caleidoscopo Electoral: Ciudades y Elecciònes en México, 1986–1994. Estudios Sociólogos Mexicanos 15, no. 44: 319–50.
412. Pardo V, Lucia P. 1989. Un Diagnóstico Acerca de la Situación de la Pequeña, Mediana y Micro Empresa: Problemas de Organización y de Financiamiento. Manuscript, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Chile.
413. Parkin, Michael. 1987. Domestic Monetary Institutions and Deficits. In Deficits, ed. J. M. Buchanan et al, 310–37. New York: Basil Blackwell.
414. Partido Acción Nacional. 1994. Plataforma Política. Marzo.
415. Pastor, Manuel, and Carol Wise. 1997. State Policy, Distribution, and Neoliberal Reform in Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 4: 419–56.
416. Pastor, Robert. 1990. Post-Revolutionary Mexico: The Salinas Opening. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 3: 1–24.
417. Peñaloza, Tomás W, and Celso Garrido. 1994. Sistema Financiero y Bancos Mexicanos en Perspectiva Internacional. In Transiciones Financieras y TLC: Canadá, México, y Estados Unidos, ed. Antonio Gutiérrez Pérez and Celso Garrido Noguera, 29–74. Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Ariel.
418. Persson, Torsten, and Lars Svensson. 1989. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit? Policy with Time Consistent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104:325–45.
419. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1993. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39: 53–84.
420. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, eds. 1994. Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Vol. 1, Credibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
421. Petras, James, and Fernando Ignacio Leiva. 1994. Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits to Electoral Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
422. Piñera, José. 1994. Chile. In The Political Economy of Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
423. Pollard, Patricia S. 1994. Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance. Federal Reserve of Saint Louis Monthly Review: 21–36.
424. Posen, Adam S. 1993. Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics. In Finance and the International Economy, ed. R. O’Brien: 7:40–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
425. Poterba, James. 1994. State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics. Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 4:799–821.
426. Price, Robert M. 1991. The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975–1990. New York: Oxford University Press.
427. Przeworski, Adam. 1986. Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Vol. 3, Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead Jr, 47–63. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
428. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
429. Przeworski, Adam. 1992. The Games of Transition. In Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 105–52. Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute with the University of Notre Dame Press.
430. Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1982. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company.
431. Puga, Cristina. 1992. Empresarios Medianos, Pequeños y Micro: Problemas de Organi-zación y Representación. Projecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México, Cuaderno 3. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
432. Puga, Cristina. 1993a. Mexico: Empresarios y Poder. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales/Porrúa.
433. Puga, Cristina. 1993b. Organizaciones Empresariales y Tratado de Libre Comercio. Proyecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México, Cuaderno 7. Mexico City, Mexico: Uni-versidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
434. Puryear, Jeffrey. 1994. Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973–1988. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
435. Quintana, Enrique. 1992. Las Negociaciones Corporativas y la Política Neoliberal. In Relaciones Corporativas en un Periodo de Transición, ed. Matilda Luna and Ricardo Pozas, 181–87. Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales.
436. Ramírez de la O, Rogelio 1994. El Informe del Banco de México para 1993: Nulo Crec-imiento. Encanal: Informe Especial No. 2: 1–26.
437. Ramírez de la O, Rogelio. 1995. The Mexican Peso Crisis and Recession of 1994–1995: Preventable Then, Avoidable in the Future? In The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives, ed. Riordan Roett, 11–32. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
438. Ramírez de la O, Rogelio. 1996. Comment. In Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets after the Mexican Crisis, eds. Guillemo A. Calvo, Morris Goldstein and Eduard Hochreiter, 50–55. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
439. Reding, Andrew. 1988a. Mexico at the Crossroads: The 1988 Election and Beyond. World Policy Journal 6, no. 5:615–49.
440. Reding, Andrew. 1988b. The New Democratic Current: A New Era in Mexico. World Policy Journal 5, no. 2:323–66.
441. Reding, Andrew. 1989. Mexico under Salinas: A Facade of Reform. World Policy Journal 6, no. 4:688–729.
442. Reding, Andrew. 1991. Mexico: The Crumbling of the “Perfect Dictatorship.” World Policy Journal 8, no. 2:55–84.
443. Regalado, Jorge. 1996. The Opposition and the 1994 Presidential Elections in Mexico. In Dismantling the Mexican State?, ed. Nikke Craske, Gareth A. Jones, David Stansfield, 152–68. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
444. Rehren, Alfredo. 1995. Empresarios, Transición, Consolidación Democrática en Chile. Manuscript, Instituto de Ciencia Política. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile.
445. Remmer, Karen. 1990. Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience. World Politics 42, no. 3: 315–55.
446. Reserve Bank of South Africa. 1993. South African Reserve Bank Act.
447. Revista Cieplan. 1988. El Consenso Económico-Social Democrático es Posible. Revista Cieplan 14: 36–44.
448. Reyes del Campillo. 1996. Modernización Política en México: Elecciones, Partidos, y Rep-resentación (1982–1994). Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropol-itana.
449. Reza Nasr, Syyed Vali. 1992. Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan. Asian Survey 32, no. 6: 521–37.
450. Ro, Sung-Tae. 1994. Korean Monetary Policy. In Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea: 1970–1990, ed. Stephan Haggard et al, 145–84. Cambridge, MA: HIID and Korean Development Institute.
451. Roberts, Kenneth. 1995. Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case. World Politics 48: 82–116.
452. Rodriguez, Victoria E, and Peter M. Ward. 1995. Opposition Government in Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
453. Rodrik, Dani. 1994. The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So Late? Why Now? Will It Last? In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, 61–88. Washington, DC: World Bank.
454. Rodrik, Dani. 1996. Understanding Economic Policy Reform. Journal of Economic Literature 34: 9–41.
455. Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
456. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:1169–90.
457. Rokkan, Stein. 1970. Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development. New York: McKay.
458. Ronfeldt, David. 1989. Prospects for Elite Cohesion. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 435–52. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
459. Ros, Jaime. 1987. Mexico: From the Oil Boom to the Debt Crisis, An Analysis of Policy Responses to External Shocks, 1978–1985. In The Latin American Debt Crisis, ed. Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead Jr. London: MacMillan.
460. Ros, Jaime. 1994. Mexico in the 1990s: A New Economic Miracle? Some Notes on the Economic and Policy Legacy of the 1980s. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 67–104. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
461. Rosende, Francisco. 1993. La Autonomía del Banco Central de Chile: Una Evaluación Preliminar. Cuadernos de Economía 91: 293–326.
462. Roubli-Kaiser, Federico. 1996. Autonomía bajo Tensión Financiera. La Experiencia Reciente de México. Cuadernos de Investigación 36, Centro de Estudios Monetar-ios Latinoamericanos, Mexico City, Mexico. Junio.
463. Rubio, Luis. 1993. El Talón de Aquiles de la Reforma Económica. Vuelta 200: 36–69.
464. SAARC-NGO. 1995. Electoral Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Elections 1993. Report of the SAARC-NGO Observers. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
465. Sachs, Jeffrey D. 1990. Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America. San Francisco: ICS Press.
466. Sachs, Jeffrey D, Aarón Tornell, and Andrés Velasco. 1995. The Collapse of the Mexican Peso Crisis: What Have We Learned? Working paper 5142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
467. Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
468. Schmulow, D, and Lorraine Greyling. 1996. Monetary Policy in the New South Africa: Economic and Political Constraints. South African Journal of Economics 64, no. 3: 175–92.
469. Schneider, Ben Ross. 1997. Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform: Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico. Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Convention, April 17–19, Mexico City, Mexico, Guadalajara, Mexico.
470. Schultz, Donald E, and Edward J. Williams. 1995. Crisis or Transformation? The Struggle for the Soul of Mexico. In Mexico Faces the 21st Century, ed. Donald E. Schultz and Edward J. Williams, 1–28. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
471. Serrano, Monica. 1996. The Legacy of Gradual Change: Rules and Institutions under Salinas. In Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas, ed. Mónica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 3–23. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
472. Shadlen, Kenneth. 2000. Neoliberalism, Corporatism, and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary Mexico. Latin American Research Review 35, no. 2: 73–106.
473. Shafqat, S. 1997. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
474. Sheahan, John. 1997. Effects of Liberalization Programs on Poverty and Inequality: Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Latin American Research Review 32, no. 3:7–37.
475. Sigmund, Paul. 1977. The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
476. Sikkink, Kathryn. 1991. Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
477. Siklos, Pierre L. 1995. Establishing Central Bank Independence: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 4, no. 3: 351–84.
478. Silva, Eduardo. 1991. The Political Economy of Chile’s Regime Transition: From Radical to “Pragmatic” Neo-Liberal Policies. In The Struggle for Democracy in Chile: 1982–1990, ed. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, 98–127. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
479. Silva, Eduardo. 1996. The State and Capital in Chile. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
480. Simmons, Beth A. 1996. Rulers of the Game: Central Bank Independence during the Interwar Years. International Organization 50, no. 3: 407–43.
481. Sims, Christopher. 1992. Interpreting the Macroeconomic Times Series Facts: The Effects of Monetary Policy. European Economic Review 26:975–1011.
482. Singh, Rai. 1994. Democracy in Pakistan: An Analysis of the 1993 Elections. In Pakistan under Democratic Regime, ed. M. D. Dharamdasani, 195–214. Varanasi, India: Shalimar Publishing House.
483. Sisk, Timothy D. 1995. Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
484. Smelser, Neil J. 1968. The Methodology of Comparative Analysis of Economic Activity. In Essays in Sociological Interpretation, ed. Neil J. Smelser, 62–75. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
485. Smit, B.W, and B. A. Mocke. 1991. Capital Flight from South Africa: Magnitude and Causes. South African Journal of Economics 59, no. 2:101–17.
486. Smith, Peter H. 1979. Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
487. Smith, Peter H. 1989. Presidencialismo and the Prospects for Political Reform. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, Monograph Series 30, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 391–416. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
488. Smith, Peter H. 1997. Political Dimensions of the Peso Crisis. In Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crisis, Sebastian Edwards and Moisés Naím, 31–53. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
489. Sohn, Hak-kyu. 1989. Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea. London: Rout-ledge.
490. Soon, Cho. 1994. The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
491. Sørenson, Georg. 1993. Democracy and Democratization. San Francisco: Westview Press.
492. Stallings, Barbara. 1992. International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform. In The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 41–88. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
493. Stals, C. L. 1993. What Financial Means Will Be Available for the Development of South Africa? South African Quarterly Reserve Bank Bulletin.
494. Stals, C. L. 1995. Monetary Policy in 1995. South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, February.
495. Stansfield, David. 1996. The Pan: The Search for Ideological and Electorial Space. In Dismantling the Mexican State, ed. Rob Atken, Nikke Craske, Gareth A. Jones, and David Stansfield, 130–57. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
496. Stark, David. 1990. Negotiating the Institutions of Democracy: Contingent Choice and Strategic Interactions in the Hungarian and Polish Transitions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
497. Starr, Pamela. 1998. Monetary Mismanagement and Inadvertent Democratization in Technocratic Mexico. Paper presented at the Twenty-first International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, September 24–26, Chicago, IL.
498. Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longsteth. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
499. Stepan, Alfred. 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
500. Stokes, Susan C. 1996. Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting. Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 5: 499–519.
501. Stokes, Susan C. 2001. Mandates, Markets, and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
502. Stone, Randall. 1996. Russia and the IMF: Reputation and Unrestricted Bargaining. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, San Francisco, CA.
503. Swinburne, Mark, and Marta Castello-Branco. 1991. Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Functions. In The Evolving Role of Central Banks, ed. Patrick Downes and Reza Vaez-Zadeh, 414–44. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
504. Tapia, Daniel. 1993. Experiencia del Banco Central Autónomo. Cuadernos de Economía 30, no. 91: 349–55.
505. Teichman, Judith. 1995. Privatization and Political Change in Mexico. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
506. Teichman, Judith. 1996. Economic Restructuring, State-Labor Relations, and the Transformation of Mexican Corporatism. In Neoliberalism Revisited: Economic Restruction and Mexico’s Political Future, ed. Gerado Otero, 149–66. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
507. Tornell, Aarón, and Gerardo Esquivel. 1995. The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into Nafta. Working paper 5322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
508. Trigueros, Ignacio. 1993. La Autonomía del Banco de México: Algunos Cabos Sueltos. Informe Mensual Sobre la Economía Mexicana 11, no. 3: 21–29.
509. Tsebelis, George. 1997. Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presiden-tialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartism. British Journal of Political Science 25:289–325.
510. Valdés, Juan Gabriel. 1995. Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile. New York: Cambridge University Press.
511. Valdés, Rodrigo. 1992. Cuantificación de la Reestructuración Sectorial Generada por la Liberalización Comercial Chilena. Colección Estudios Cieplan 35: 55–83.
512. Valdés Ugalde, Francisco 1994. From Bank Nationalization to State Reform: Business and the New Mexican Order. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Mid-dlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 219–42. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
513. Valdés Ugalde, Francisco. 1996. The Private Sector and Political Regime Change in Mexico. In Neoliber-alism Revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico’s Political Future, ed. Gerardo Otero, 127–47. New York: Westview Press.
514. Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
515. Valenzuela, Arturo. 1991. The Military in Power: The Consolidation of One-Man Rule. In The Struggle for Democracy in Chile: 1982–1990, ed. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, 21–72. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
516. Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Setting: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions. In Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 57–104. Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute with the University of Notre Dame Press.
517. Van de Walle, Nicholas 1991. The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa. African Affairs 90:383–405.
518. Van de Walle, Nicholas. 1994. The Politics of Non-Reform in Cameroon. In Hemmed In: Responses to Africa’s Economic Decline, ed. Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, 357–97. New York: Columbia University Press.
519. Varas, Augusto. 1987. Los Militares en el Poder. Santiago, Chile: FLACSO-Pehuén.
520. Vergara, Pilar. 1985. Auge y Caída del Neoliberalismo en Chile. Santiago, Chile: FLACSO.
521. Vergara, Pilar. 1993. Ruptura y Continuidad en la Política Social del Gobierno Democrático Chileno. Revista Mexicana de Sociología Año 55, no. 3: 169–202.
522. Vergara, Pilar. 1994. Market Economy, Social Welfare, and Democratic Consolidation in Chile. In Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, ed. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, 237–62. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
523. Vergara, Pilar. 1997. In Pursuit of “Growth with Equity”: The Limits of Chile’s Free-Market Social Reforms. International Journal of Health Services 27, no. 2:207–15.
524. Walsh, Carl E. 1994. Is There a Cost to Central Bank Independence? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Weekly Letter 94–05, February 4.
525. Walsh, Carl E. 1995a. Central Bank Independence and the Short-Run Output-Inflation Trade-off in the European Community. In Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Integrated Europe, ed. Barry Eichengreen, Jeffry Frieden, and Jurgen von Hagen, 12–37. New York: Springer-Verlag.
526. Walsh, Carl E. 1995b. Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers. American Economic Review 85:150–67.
527. Waseem, M. 1992. Pakistan’s Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy. Asian Survey 32, no. 7: 617–34.
528. Waseem, M. 1994. The 1993 Elections in Pakistan. Karachi: Vanguard Books.
529. Way, Christopher. 2000. Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes. Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 2: 196–224.
530. Weintraub, Sidney. 1990. Transforming the Mexican Economy: The Salinas Sexenio. Washington, DC: National Planning Association.
531. Weintraub, Sidney, and M. Delal Baer. 1992. The Interplay between Economic and Political Opening: The Sequence in Mexico. Washington Quarterly: 187–201.
532. Weldon, Jeffrey. 1997. Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico. In Presidential-ism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 225–58. New York: Cambridge University Press.
533. Werner, Martín. 1995. La Banca de Desarrollo: 1988–1994, Balances y Perspectivas. El Mercado de Valores 1: 9–25.
534. Weyland, Kurt. 1997. “Growth with Equity” in Chile’s New Democracy? Latin American Research Review 31, no. 1:37–67.
535. Whitehead, Laurence Jr. 1989. Political Change and Economic Stabilization: The Economic Solidarity Pact. In Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures, Monograph Series 30, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, 181–214. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
536. Whitehead, Laurence Jr. 1994. Prospects for a “Transition” from Authoritarian Rule in Mexico. In The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, ed. Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin C. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horca-sitas, 327–46. La Jolla: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mex-ican Studies.
537. Wiarda, Howard J. 1989. Mexico: The Unravelling of a Corporatist Regime? Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 4:1–28.
538. Williamson, John. 1995. What Role for Currency Boards? Policy Analysis in International Economics 40. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, September.
539. Williamson, John and Stephan Haggard. 1994. The Political Conditions for Policy Reform. In The Political Economy of Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson, 525–96. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
540. Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
541. Wisecarver, Daniel, ed. 1993. El Modelo Económico Chileno. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica.
542. Woo-Cummings, Meredith. 1997. Slouching toward the Market: The Politics of Financial Liberalization in South Korea. In Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States, ed. Michael Loriaux et al, 57–91. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
543. Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 1999. The Stakes of the Game: The Politics of Redistribution in Democratic Transitions. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 2–5, Atlanta, GA.
544. Wooley, John T. 1984. Monetary Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
545. Young, Crawford. 1993. The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
546. Zahler, Roberto. 1989a. La Inserción Institucional del Banco Central de Chile. Cuader-nosde Economía 26, no. 77: 97–114.
547. Zahler, Roberto. 1989b. Comentarios a la Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Banco Central de Chile. Manuscript, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile.
548. Zielinsky, Jacub. 1995. Political Parties and Central Bank Autonomy. Paper presented at the Fifty-third Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 6–8, Chicago, IL