Political capital: Mexican financial policy under Salinas

World Politics

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 36-66

  Kessler, Timothy P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; MARKET TRANSITION; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL PROCESS;

MEXICO;

EID: 0031786239     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100007784     Document Type: Article

References (159)

1. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 203-5; Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
2. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 203-5; Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
3. Blanca Heredia, "Making Economic Reform Politically Viable: The Mexican Experience," in William Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America (Miami, Fla.: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1994), 270-79; Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 232; Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Andrew Reding, "Mexico under Salinas: A Facade of Reform," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989).
4. Blanca Heredia, "Making Economic Reform Politically Viable: The Mexican Experience," in William Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America (Miami, Fla.: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1994), 270-79; Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 232; Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Andrew Reding, "Mexico under Salinas: A Facade of Reform," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989).
5. Blanca Heredia, "Making Economic Reform Politically Viable: The Mexican Experience," in William Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America (Miami, Fla.: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1994), 270-79; Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 232; Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Andrew Reding, "Mexico under Salinas: A Facade of Reform," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989).
6. Blanca Heredia, "Making Economic Reform Politically Viable: The Mexican Experience," in William Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America (Miami, Fla.: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1994), 270-79; Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 232; Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Andrew Reding, "Mexico under Salinas: A Facade of Reform," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989).
7. Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994), 153; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nation-Building, Participation and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Robert Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
8. Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994), 153; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nation-Building, Participation and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Robert Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
9. Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994), 153; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nation-Building, Participation and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Robert Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
10. Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994), 153; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nation-Building, Participation and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Robert Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
11. See Francisco Valdés Ugalde, "From Bank Nationalization to State Reform: Business and the New Mexican Order," in Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar, eds., The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); Judith Teichman, "The Mexican State and the Political Implications of Economic Restructuring," Latin American Perspectives 19 (Spring 1992).
12. See Francisco Valdés Ugalde, "From Bank Nationalization to State Reform: Business and the New Mexican Order," in Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar, eds., The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); Judith Teichman, "The Mexican State and the Political Implications of Economic Restructuring," Latin American Perspectives 19 (Spring 1992).
13. See Geri Smith, "A Tear in Mexico's Curtain of Democracy," Business Week (March 23, 1993), 47.
14. Guy Poitras and Raymond Robinson, "The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36 (Spring 1994).
15. During his candidacy Salinas angered many old-guard politicians by declaring his approval of the end of the PRI's monopoly, while as president he frequently stated publicly that the party's days of clientelism and patronage were numbered. See Juan Molinar and Jeffrey Weldon, "Elecciones de 1988 en México: Crisis del autoritarismo," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 52 (October-December 1990), 230-31; Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 2), 14-36.
16. During his candidacy Salinas angered many old-guard politicians by declaring his approval of the end of the PRI's monopoly, while as president he frequently stated publicly that the party's days of clientelism and patronage were numbered. See Juan Molinar and Jeffrey Weldon, "Elecciones de 1988 en México: Crisis del autoritarismo," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 52 (October-December 1990), 230-31; Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 2), 14-36.
17. See Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
18. The técnicos emerged as highly skilled, insulated economic bureaucrats who took over the policy-making process from old-guard politicos. See Peter Smith, "Leadership and Change: Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp, ed., Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); Juan D. Lindau, "Schisms in the Mexican Political Elite and the Technocratic/Politician Typology," Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 8 (Summer 1992), 217; Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992), 83-84.
19. The técnicos emerged as highly skilled, insulated economic bureaucrats who took over the policy-making process from old-guard politicos. See Peter Smith, "Leadership and Change: Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp, ed., Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); Juan D. Lindau, "Schisms in the Mexican Political Elite and the Technocratic/Politician Typology," Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 8 (Summer 1992), 217; Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992), 83-84.
20. The técnicos emerged as highly skilled, insulated economic bureaucrats who took over the policy-making process from old-guard politicos. See Peter Smith, "Leadership and Change: Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp, ed., Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); Juan D. Lindau, "Schisms in the Mexican Political Elite and the Technocratic/Politician Typology," Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 8 (Summer 1992), 217; Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992), 83-84.
21. John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly. "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46 (October 1993), 57-58; Helleiner (fn. 1), 160; Vogel (fn. 1), 1996.
22. John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly. "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46 (October 1993), 57-58; Helleiner (fn. 1), 160; Vogel (fn. 1), 1996.
23. V. V. Bhatt, Financial Innovation and Credit Market Development, Working Paper WPS 52 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, August 1989), 16.
24. For example, when the U.S. innovated short-term debt securities to finance its deficit in the 1980s, countries all over the world followed suit to remain attractive to global investors. See Philip G. Cerny, "Financial Market Deregulation and the Competition State" (Discussion paper, American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988), 43-46.
25. Elsewhere among Latin America and Asian reformers, exchange rates today range from fixed to floating, while foreign bank penetration varies from less than 5 percent in Indonesia and Taiwan, to about 10 percent in Mexico and Brazil and almost 25 percent in Chile and Argentina. See "How Far Is Down?" Economist (November 15, 1997), 20.
26. See especially Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Capital Account Liberalization," in Helmut Reisen and Bernard Fischer, eds., Financial Opening: Policy Issues and Experiences in Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1993).
27. Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (Fall 1991), 440-41.
28. Lorenzo Meyer, "Mexico: The Political Problems of Economic Stabilization," in Donald L. Wyman, ed., Mexico's Economic Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1983), 122.
29. On labor relations, see Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1992); Enrique de la Garza Toledo, "The Restructuring of State-Labor Relations in Mexico," in Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar (fn. 4).
30. On labor relations, see Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1992); Enrique de la Garza Toledo, "The Restructuring of State-Labor Relations in Mexico," in Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar (fn. 4).
31. José Antonio Crespo, "Crisis Económica: Crisis de Legitimidad," in Carlos Bazdresch et al., eds., Mexico: Auge, crisis y ajuste (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 31.
32. Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 2), 27-28.
33. Soledad Loaeza and Claudio Stern, eds., Las clases medias en la coyuntura actual (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Sociales, Colegio de México, 1990).
34. Meyer (fn. 16), 121-22.
35. See Molinar and Weldon (fn. 7); Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. Patrick Peritore and Ana Karina Peritore, "Cleavage and Polarization in Mexico's Ruling Party," Journal of Developing Areas 28 (October 1993), 72-73.
36. See Molinar and Weldon (fn. 7); Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. Patrick Peritore and Ana Karina Peritore, "Cleavage and Polarization in Mexico's Ruling Party," Journal of Developing Areas 28 (October 1993), 72-73.
37. See Molinar and Weldon (fn. 7); Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. Patrick Peritore and Ana Karina Peritore, "Cleavage and Polarization in Mexico's Ruling Party," Journal of Developing Areas 28 (October 1993), 72-73.
38. Highly educated Mexicans voted for the PAN at twice the national average; see Camp (fn. 22), 81.
39. Author interview, Mexico City, December 10, 1998.
40. Stephen D. Morris, Political Reformism in Mexico (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 72.
41. Miguel Basañez, El pulso de los sexenios: 20 años de crisis en México (Mexico City: Siglo Veiniuno, 1990), 225-29.
42. For the success of neo-cardenismo among the popular sectors, see Tonatiuh Guillén López, "The Social Bases of the PRI," in Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 2), 256-58.
43. Kathleen Bruhn, "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico," Comparative Politics 28 (January 1996), 155.
44. Molinar and Weldon (fn. 7), 252.
45. Camp (fn. 22), 156-57.
46. Not coincidentally, this group had bought virtually the entire banking system. See Fernando Ortega Pizarro, "El proyecto económico de México," Proceso (September 9, 1991), 24-27.
47. For example, J. P Morgan floated a $1 billion bridge loan to the group that successfully bid on Bancomer, Mexico's second-largest bank. See "The High Price of Bank Sell-Offs," Euromoney Supplement (January 1992), 20.
48. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, La reforma financiera y la desincorforación bancaria (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 220.
49. A major reason was that the banks had primarily invested in high-yield, low-risk government securities. See Economía Mexicana (1986), 56-57.
50. A central element of deregulation was the elimination of controls over interest rates. See Robert R. Moore, "The Government Budget Deficit and the Banking System: The Case of Mexico," Financial Industry Studies (1993); Ortiz (fn. 33), 297. Selective credit requirements were also eliminated. See Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 80; Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 108. The reserve requirement, which was eliminated in 1989, dramatically increased credit to the private sector. See Samantha Laurie, "Oxygen of Recovery," Banker 140 (April 1990), 50.
51. A central element of deregulation was the elimination of controls over interest rates. See Robert R. Moore, "The Government Budget Deficit and the Banking System: The Case of Mexico," Financial Industry Studies (1993); Ortiz (fn. 33), 297. Selective credit requirements were also eliminated. See Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 80; Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 108. The reserve requirement, which was eliminated in 1989, dramatically increased credit to the private sector. See Samantha Laurie, "Oxygen of Recovery," Banker 140 (April 1990), 50.
52. A central element of deregulation was the elimination of controls over interest rates. See Robert R. Moore, "The Government Budget Deficit and the Banking System: The Case of Mexico," Financial Industry Studies (1993); Ortiz (fn. 33), 297. Selective credit requirements were also eliminated. See Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 80; Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 108. The reserve requirement, which was eliminated in 1989, dramatically increased credit to the private sector. See Samantha Laurie, "Oxygen of Recovery," Banker 140 (April 1990), 50.
53. A central element of deregulation was the elimination of controls over interest rates. See Robert R. Moore, "The Government Budget Deficit and the Banking System: The Case of Mexico," Financial Industry Studies (1993); Ortiz (fn. 33), 297. Selective credit requirements were also eliminated. See Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 80; Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 108. The reserve requirement, which was eliminated in 1989, dramatically increased credit to the private sector. See Samantha Laurie, "Oxygen of Recovery," Banker 140 (April 1990), 50.
54. A central element of deregulation was the elimination of controls over interest rates. See Robert R. Moore, "The Government Budget Deficit and the Banking System: The Case of Mexico," Financial Industry Studies (1993); Ortiz (fn. 33), 297. Selective credit requirements were also eliminated. See Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 80; Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 108. The reserve requirement, which was eliminated in 1989, dramatically increased credit to the private sector. See Samantha Laurie, "Oxygen of Recovery," Banker 140 (April 1990), 50.
55. Sergio Sarmiento, El Norte (April 5, 1989).
56. A major reason was to enable domestic banks to compete for global capital. See Michael Marray, "Growing Pains," Euromoney (September 1992), 148; Aspe (fn. 35), 89. José-Ramon Palencia Gomez, "Evolution of the Mexican Financial System towards a Universal Bank," Money Affairs 5, no. 1 (1992); Academia Mexicana de Derecho Bursátil, "Actualización sobre las adiciones a las leyes del mercado de valores y sociedades de inversion" (Mexico City, 1990), 24.
57. A major reason was to enable domestic banks to compete for global capital. See Michael Marray, "Growing Pains," Euromoney (September 1992), 148; Aspe (fn. 35), 89. José-Ramon Palencia Gomez, "Evolution of the Mexican Financial System towards a Universal Bank," Money Affairs 5, no. 1 (1992); Academia Mexicana de Derecho Bursátil, "Actualización sobre las adiciones a las leyes del mercado de valores y sociedades de inversion" (Mexico City, 1990), 24.
58. A major reason was to enable domestic banks to compete for global capital. See Michael Marray, "Growing Pains," Euromoney (September 1992), 148; Aspe (fn. 35), 89. José-Ramon Palencia Gomez, "Evolution of the Mexican Financial System towards a Universal Bank," Money Affairs 5, no. 1 (1992); Academia Mexicana de Derecho Bursátil, "Actualización sobre las adiciones a las leyes del mercado de valores y sociedades de inversion" (Mexico City, 1990), 24.
59. A major reason was to enable domestic banks to compete for global capital. See Michael Marray, "Growing Pains," Euromoney (September 1992), 148; Aspe (fn. 35), 89. José-Ramon Palencia Gomez, "Evolution of the Mexican Financial System towards a Universal Bank," Money Affairs 5, no. 1 (1992); Academia Mexicana de Derecho Bursátil, "Actualización sobre las adiciones a las leyes del mercado de valores y sociedades de inversion" (Mexico City, 1990), 24.
60. "A Latin Big Bang," Mexico Survey, Economist (February 13, 1993), S16; Kenneth Jameson, "The Financial Sector in Latin American Restructuring," in Werner Baer and Melissa H. Birch, eds., Privatization in Latin America (London: Praeger, 1994), 126.
61. "A Latin Big Bang," Mexico Survey, Economist (February 13, 1993), S16; Kenneth Jameson, "The Financial Sector in Latin American Restructuring," in Werner Baer and Melissa H. Birch, eds., Privatization in Latin America (London: Praeger, 1994), 126.
62. Antonio Gutiérrez Pérez and Ignacio Perrotini, "Liberalización financiera y estabilización macroeconómica en México: Dasafíos y perspectivas," Investigación Económica 209 (July-September 1994); Javier Gavito and Ignacio Trigueros, "Los Efectos del TLC sobre las entidades financieras," in Georgina Kessel, ed., Lo negociado del TLC (Mexico City: McGraw-Hill, 1994). Mexico also argued that because American legislation prohibits national retail banking, U.S. branch ownership and "financial group" status would be prohibited. See Rossanna Fuentes, "Serios peligros para el sistema de pagos," El Financiero (February 13, 1992), 3; Isabel J. Mayoral, "No modificará EU su legislación bancaria," Uno Más Uno (June 12, 1992), 18.
63. Antonio Gutiérrez Pérez and Ignacio Perrotini, "Liberalización financiera y estabilización macroeconómica en México: Dasafíos y perspectivas," Investigación Económica 209 (July-September 1994); Javier Gavito and Ignacio Trigueros, "Los Efectos del TLC sobre las entidades financieras," in Georgina Kessel, ed., Lo negociado del TLC (Mexico City: McGraw-Hill, 1994). Mexico also argued that because American legislation prohibits national retail banking, U.S. branch ownership and "financial group" status would be prohibited. See Rossanna Fuentes, "Serios peligros para el sistema de pagos," El Financiero (February 13, 1992), 3; Isabel J. Mayoral, "No modificará EU su legislación bancaria," Uno Más Uno (June 12, 1992), 18.
64. Antonio Gutiérrez Pérez and Ignacio Perrotini, "Liberalización financiera y estabilización macroeconómica en México: Dasafíos y perspectivas," Investigación Económica 209 (July-September 1994); Javier Gavito and Ignacio Trigueros, "Los Efectos del TLC sobre las entidades financieras," in Georgina Kessel, ed., Lo negociado del TLC (Mexico City: McGraw-Hill, 1994). Mexico also argued that because American legislation prohibits national retail banking, U.S. branch ownership and "financial group" status would be prohibited. See Rossanna Fuentes, "Serios peligros para el sistema de pagos," El Financiero (February 13, 1992), 3; Isabel J. Mayoral, "No modificará EU su legislación bancaria," Uno Más Uno (June 12, 1992), 18.
65. Antonio Gutiérrez Pérez and Ignacio Perrotini, "Liberalización financiera y estabilización macroeconómica en México: Dasafíos y perspectivas," Investigación Económica 209 (July-September 1994); Javier Gavito and Ignacio Trigueros, "Los Efectos del TLC sobre las entidades financieras," in Georgina Kessel, ed., Lo negociado del TLC (Mexico City: McGraw-Hill, 1994). Mexico also argued that because American legislation prohibits national retail banking, U.S. branch ownership and "financial group" status would be prohibited. See Rossanna Fuentes, "Serios peligros para el sistema de pagos," El Financiero (February 13, 1992), 3; Isabel J. Mayoral, "No modificará EU su legislación bancaria," Uno Más Uno (June 12, 1992), 18.
66. No single U.S. or Canadian banking subsidiary could initially gain a market share larger than 1.5 percent of the total capital. Furthermore, the combined total of all foreign banks could not exceed 8 percent of net capital until the year 2000, after which the ceiling would be raised to 15 percent. By 2004 the banking sector was to be completely liberalized; however, a safeguard clause allowed the Mexican government to extend a grace period to the market share ceiling until 2007 if foreign bank penetration reached 25 percent. See Paul et al., North American Free Trade Agreement: Summary and Analysis (New York: Matthew Bender, 1993), 67-72. Following the 1994 peso crisis Zedillo raised market share ceilings in order to provide foreign capital for local and regional banks facing insolvency.
67. William C. Gruben, John H. Welch, and Jeffrey W. Gunther, "U.S. Banks, Competition and the Mexican Banking System: How Much Will NAFTA Matter?" Financial Industry Studies (October 1993).
68. Gutiérrez Pérez and Perrotini (fn. 39), 93.
69. "Banca '93: Impulsarán nuevos bancos competencia," El Norte (September 6, 1993).
70. Alberto Musalem, Dimitri Vittas, and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "North American Free Trade Agreement: Issues on Trade in Financial Services for Mexico" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993). By comparison, charter minimums for American banks are between one and five million dollars.
71. Robert P. McComb, William C. Gruben, and John H, Welch, "Privatization and Performance in the Mexican Financial Services Industry," Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 34 (Summer 1994), 226.
72. Gustavo Vega, "NAFTA and Financial Services" in Gustavo del Castillo and Gustavo Vega, eds., The Politics of Free Trade in North America (Ottawa: Centre for Trade and Policy Law, 1995); Catherine Mansell, "The Internationalization of the Mexican Financial System" (Paper presented at the Conference on the Global and Comparative Analysis of Financial Institutions, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Conference and Study Center, May 1994), 31.
73. Gustavo Vega, "NAFTA and Financial Services" in Gustavo del Castillo and Gustavo Vega, eds., The Politics of Free Trade in North America (Ottawa: Centre for Trade and Policy Law, 1995); Catherine Mansell, "The Internationalization of the Mexican Financial System" (Paper presented at the Conference on the Global and Comparative Analysis of Financial Institutions, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Conference and Study Center, May 1994), 31.
74. Excélsior (October 6, 1993).
75. Asociación Mexicana de Bancos, "La banca mexicana en transición: Retos y perpectivas," Comerdo Exterior 41 (February 1990).
76. El Financiero (November 21, 1991), 15.
77. Janine Rodiles and Mauricio Flores, "Garantiza TLC protección financiera," El Norte (August 14, 1992).
78. El Financiero, (February 13, 1992), 3.
79. Arturo Hanono, Expansión (December 11, 1991).
80. Antonio Gershenson, La Jornada (February 16, 1992), 5.
81. Author interview with Julio Alfredo Genel, Mexico City, November 28, 1994.
82. Author interview with David Vargas, PAN deputy, Cámara de Diputados, Mexico City, March 10, 1995.
83. See especially Francisco Suárez Dávila, "Liberación, regulación y supervisión del sistema bancario mexicano," Comercio Exterior 44 (December 1994).
84. Author interview, on condition of anonymity, Mexico City, April 4, 1994.
85. See Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox, "Mexico's National Solidarity Program: An Overview," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox, eds., Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (San Diego, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); Bruhn (fn. 28).
86. See Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox, "Mexico's National Solidarity Program: An Overview," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox, eds., Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (San Diego, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); Bruhn (fn. 28).
87. See Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991); Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox, "Mexico's National Solidarity Program: An Overview," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox, eds., Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (San Diego, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); Bruhn (fn. 28).
88. Centeno (fn. 2), 65-66.
89. It is impossible to calculate exactly how much of the bank sale revenue went to Pronasol, because the Mexican government has long kept major items of discretionary spending secret. In December 1997 opposition members of Congress, who accused the PRI of using the budget for political purposes, demanded that President Zedillo make all public spending transparent.
90. Enrique González Tiburcio, "Social Reform in Mexico: Six Theses on the National Solidarity Program," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 58), 72.
91. Matt Moffett, "Barrio Brigades," Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1993, A7.
92. Juan Manuel Alvarado, "Usará Pronasol fondo de la venta de bancos," El Norte (March 11, 1992).
93. Mexico on the Record (July 1992), 4.
94. Carlos Acosta, "El dinero no viene y Salinas vende casi lo único que quedaba: La banca," Proceso (May 7, 1990), 9.
95. Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 58).
96. In 1992 number two Bancomer enjoyed 108 percent growth in profits, while number one Banamex had an 84 percent surge. See Marray (fn. 37), 148-50. See the following examples of the extensive literature on high Mexican bank profits: Geri Smith and Wendy Zellner, "The Gringo Banks Are Drooling," Business Week (September 13, 1993), 84; and Alicia Girón, "La banca comercial de México frente al TLC," Comercio Exterior 44 (December 1994), 1074. Data obtained from Banamex shareholder reports demonstrated that even a moderate decline in interest rates posed the threat of firm failure. See Ramón Pieza, "Banamex, difícil llegar al bicentenario," El Financiero (November 28, 1994), 14A.
97. In 1992 number two Bancomer enjoyed 108 percent growth in profits, while number one Banamex had an 84 percent surge. See Marray (fn. 37), 148-50. See the following examples of the extensive literature on high Mexican bank profits: Geri Smith and Wendy Zellner, "The Gringo Banks Are Drooling," Business Week (September 13, 1993), 84; and Alicia Girón, "La banca comercial de México frente al TLC," Comercio Exterior 44 (December 1994), 1074. Data obtained from Banamex shareholder reports demonstrated that even a moderate decline in interest rates posed the threat of firm failure. See Ramón Pieza, "Banamex, difícil llegar al bicentenario," El Financiero (November 28, 1994), 14A.
98. In 1992 number two Bancomer enjoyed 108 percent growth in profits, while number one Banamex had an 84 percent surge. See Marray (fn. 37), 148-50. See the following examples of the extensive literature on high Mexican bank profits: Geri Smith and Wendy Zellner, "The Gringo Banks Are Drooling," Business Week (September 13, 1993), 84; and Alicia Girón, "La banca comercial de México frente al TLC," Comercio Exterior 44 (December 1994), 1074. Data obtained from Banamex shareholder reports demonstrated that even a moderate decline in interest rates posed the threat of firm failure. See Ramón Pieza, "Banamex, difícil llegar al bicentenario," El Financiero (November 28, 1994), 14A.
99. See Expansión (August 18, 1993), 349; Juanita Darling, "Privatized Mexican Banks Get Ready for Foreign Competition," Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1993, D4.
100. See Expansión (August 18, 1993), 349; Juanita Darling, "Privatized Mexican Banks Get Ready for Foreign Competition," Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1993, D4.
101. These obstacles were later overcome by outrage and insolvency. In 1995 a national debtors' movement called El Barzón, including hundreds of thousands of consumers, businessmen, and farmers, faced real interest rates of 40 to 50 percent and threatened a moratorium on loan payments until there was some serious relief from the high rates.
102. In the early 1990s customers applying for the basic credit card at either of the country's largest banks needed to show proof of a salary of only about $335 per month. See Anne Geyer, "Credit Card Surge," Business Mexico (June 1991), 4.
103. In 1992 banks charged businesses real interest rates over 20 percent, three to four times higher than U.S. levels. See Fernando Ortego Pizarro, "La banca quedó en manos de mexicanos, pero muy pocos," Proceso (July 13, 1992), 9. Over two years after reprivatization, medium-size firms in Mexico paid 25 percent interest and had difficulty obtaining loans for longer than six months. See Juanita Darling and Chris Kraul, "U.S. Banks Eager to Enter Mexico," Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1993, D1. A 1993 study revealed that real interest rates for small industries in Nuevo Leon ranged from 19.8 to 21.5 percent, while the U.S. variation was between 4.5 and 5 percent. Juan Antonio Lara, "Demanda caintra acelerar la compentencia bancaria," El Norte (May 21, 1993).
104. In 1992 banks charged businesses real interest rates over 20 percent, three to four times higher than U.S. levels. See Fernando Ortego Pizarro, "La banca quedó en manos de mexicanos, pero muy pocos," Proceso (July 13, 1992), 9. Over two years after reprivatization, medium-size firms in Mexico paid 25 percent interest and had difficulty obtaining loans for longer than six months. See Juanita Darling and Chris Kraul, "U.S. Banks Eager to Enter Mexico," Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1993, D1. A 1993 study revealed that real interest rates for small industries in Nuevo Leon ranged from 19.8 to 21.5 percent, while the U.S. variation was between 4.5 and 5 percent. Juan Antonio Lara, "Demanda caintra acelerar la compentencia bancaria," El Norte (May 21, 1993).
105. In 1992 banks charged businesses real interest rates over 20 percent, three to four times higher than U.S. levels. See Fernando Ortego Pizarro, "La banca quedó en manos de mexicanos, pero muy pocos," Proceso (July 13, 1992), 9. Over two years after reprivatization, medium-size firms in Mexico paid 25 percent interest and had difficulty obtaining loans for longer than six months. See Juanita Darling and Chris Kraul, "U.S. Banks Eager to Enter Mexico," Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1993, D1. A 1993 study revealed that real interest rates for small industries in Nuevo Leon ranged from 19.8 to 21.5 percent, while the U.S. variation was between 4.5 and 5 percent. Juan Antonio Lara, "Demanda caintra acelerar la compentencia bancaria," El Norte (May 21, 1993).
106. El Financiero (October 19, 1992), 40.
107. El Financiero (June 3, 1992), 14.
108. Carmen Alvarez, "Molesta a empresarios negociación financiera," El Norte (October 8, 1992).
109. El Financiero (December 9, 1994), 30A.
110. See Diane E. Davis, "Mexico's New Politics: Changing Perspectives on Free Trade," World Policy Journal 9 (Fall-Winter 1992), 664-66; Ken Shadlen, "Corporatism and the Associative Logics of Business: Small Industry and the State in Post-Revolutionary Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997).
111. See Diane E. Davis, "Mexico's New Politics: Changing Perspectives on Free Trade," World Policy Journal 9 (Fall-Winter 1992), 664-66; Ken Shadlen, "Corporatism and the Associative Logics of Business: Small Industry and the State in Post-Revolutionary Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997).
112. A month before the 1994 election, PRD candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas promised that his administration would pressure the banks to lower interest rates. However, when asked to openly support a greater opening to foreign banks, he declined. El Financiero (June 12, 1994), 45.
113. Author's interview, Mexico City, March 10, 1995.
114. Carlos Salinas de Gotari, "Economic Highlights of the Sixth Annual Presidential Report," Mercado de Valores (January-February 1995), 13.
115. For a commentary on the technical flaws in Salinas's economic model, see Nora Lustig, The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995); Rogelio Ramírez de la O, "The Mexican Peso Crisis and Recession of 1994-1995: Preventable Then, Avoidable in the Future?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 18-22. Mexico's impressive export growth, which was largely based on production from foreign corporations, was thus inextricably linked to increasing imports. Exporters outside the maquiladora (maquila) sector (foreign-owned assembly plants that export back to the home country) also relied increasingly on intermediate goods from abroad. From 1989 to 1993, while Mexican non-maquila exports rose 31.9 percent, from $22.8 billion to $30 billion, an annual increase of 7.2 percent, non-maguila imports rose by an astonishing 109 percent, from $23.4 billion to $48.9 billion, an average of 20.2 percent per year. See El Inversionista Mexicano (August 29, 1994), 1.
116. For a commentary on the technical flaws in Salinas's economic model, see Nora Lustig, The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995); Rogelio Ramírez de la O, "The Mexican Peso Crisis and Recession of 1994-1995: Preventable Then, Avoidable in the Future?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 18-22. Mexico's impressive export growth, which was largely based on production from foreign corporations, was thus inextricably linked to increasing imports. Exporters outside the maquiladora (maquila) sector (foreign-owned assembly plants that export back to the home country) also relied increasingly on intermediate goods from abroad. From 1989 to 1993, while Mexican non-maquila exports rose 31.9 percent, from $22.8 billion to $30 billion, an annual increase of 7.2 percent, non-maguila imports rose by an astonishing 109 percent, from $23.4 billion to $48.9 billion, an average of 20.2 percent per year. See El Inversionista Mexicano (August 29, 1994), 1.
117. For a commentary on the technical flaws in Salinas's economic model, see Nora Lustig, The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995); Rogelio Ramírez de la O, "The Mexican Peso Crisis and Recession of 1994-1995: Preventable Then, Avoidable in the Future?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 18-22. Mexico's impressive export growth, which was largely based on production from foreign corporations, was thus inextricably linked to increasing imports. Exporters outside the maquiladora (maquila) sector (foreign-owned assembly plants that export back to the home country) also relied increasingly on intermediate goods from abroad. From 1989 to 1993, while Mexican non-maquila exports rose 31.9 percent, from $22.8 billion to $30 billion, an annual increase of 7.2 percent, non-maguila imports rose by an astonishing 109 percent, from $23.4 billion to $48.9 billion, an average of 20.2 percent per year. See El Inversionista Mexicano (August 29, 1994), 1.
118. Laura Carlsen, "La bolsa mexicana de valores," El Cotidiano 59 (1993), 112; Laurie (fh. 35), 49.
119. Agustín Carstens, "Foreign Exchange and Monetary Policy in Mexico," Columbia Journal of World Business 29 (Summer 1994), 75.
120. Ajustabonos (adjustable bonds) offered real interest after covering for inflation, while tesobonos (treasury bonds) guaranteed payment indexed to the exchange rate. See Ana Laura de Coss, "Instrumentos de inversión que ofrecen protección cambiaria," El Economista (October 7, 1994), F16.
121. Expansión (November 21, 1990), 59.
122. Mercado de Valores (November-December 1994), 31.
123. LatinFinance (July 1992), 58.
124. See especially "Déficit comercial de México: ¿Sostenible?" Este País (May 1993), 26.
125. Fear of inflation following moderate U.S. growth led the Federal Reserve to almost double interest rates in 1994, from 3 percent to 5.5 percent. For a discussion of the effect of U.S. interest rates on emerging markets, see Masood Ahmed and Sudarshan Goopta, "Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries," Finance and Development (1993), 11.
126. For an evaluation of the unsustainable buildup of tesobono debt accumulated in 1994, see the special isue on debt of El Inversionista Mexicano (July 25, 1994). For economic analyses of the peso crisis, see Journal of International Economics 41 (November 1996); James Cypher, "Mexico: Financial Fragility or Structural Crisis?" Journal of Economic Issues 30 (June 1996).
127. For an evaluation of the unsustainable buildup of tesobono debt accumulated in 1994, see the special isue on debt of El Inversionista Mexicano (July 25, 1994). For economic analyses of the peso crisis, see Journal of International Economics 41 (November 1996); James Cypher, "Mexico: Financial Fragility or Structural Crisis?" Journal of Economic Issues 30 (June 1996).
128. For an evaluation of the unsustainable buildup of tesobono debt accumulated in 1994, see the special isue on debt of El Inversionista Mexicano (July 25, 1994). For economic analyses of the peso crisis, see Journal of International Economics 41 (November 1996); James Cypher, "Mexico: Financial Fragility or Structural Crisis?" Journal of Economic Issues 30 (June 1996).
129. Juan José Hinojosa, Proceso (March 1, 1994), 34.
130. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
131. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
132. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
133. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
134. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
135. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner, "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994), 253; Steve H. Hanke and Alan Walters, "The Wobbly Peso," Forbes (July 4, 1994), 161. Gregorio Guillén, "Reforma económica, mecanismos de financiamiento y procesos de inversion," Comercio Exterior 44, no. 12 (1994), 1062; Mexico Insight (May 1, 1994), 19; El Financiero (November 26, 1992), 8; Victoria Griffith, "Growing Pains," LatinFinance 45 (1993), 38.
136. See Robert R. Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, The Politics of the Economic Solidarity Pact in Mexico: December 1987 to December 1988 (Washington D.C.: World Bank Project on the Political Economy of Economic Reform, July 1992), 43.
137. Alejandro Márquez, "Tipo de cambio: No lo toques, por favor," Expansión (June 1993), Gobierno Mexicano (April 1991), 39.
138. Alejandro Márquez, "Tipo de cambio: No lo toques, por favor," Expansión (June 1993), Gobierno Mexicano (April 1991), 39.
139. LatinFinance (March 1993), 67.
140. LatinFinance (May 1991), 19.
141. Celso Garrido, "National Private Groups in Mexico, 1987-1993," Cepal Review 53 (1994).
142. See Luis F. Stein Velasco, "Menor carga financiera," Alto Nivel (November 1988), 15; El Financiero (November 25, 1991), 87.
143. See Luis F. Stein Velasco, "Menor carga financiera," Alto Nivel (November 1988), 15; El Financiero (November 25, 1991), 87.
144. A widely cited 1990 UNAM study reported that Mexico's real minimum wage had fallen by more than one-third since 1987 and was worth less than half its 1982 value. In 1994 a government commission calculated the nation's average real salary at 25 percent below 1982 levels. See El Financiero (November 25, 1994), 24.
145. Carlos Salinas, "El nuevo pacto para la estabilidad, la competitividad y el empleo (PECE)," Mercado de Valores 21 (1992), 3-5.
146. Patricia Nelson "PECE with the Peso," Mexico Business News (June 1990), A7.
147. The National Industrial Chamber, the Confederation of Industrial Associations, and the National Council of Foreign Commerce all supported the maintenance of the peg through 1994. See El Financiero (November 16, 1994), 28; La Jornada (August 31, 1994), 43; El Norte (April 3, 1993).
148. The National Industrial Chamber, the Confederation of Industrial Associations, and the National Council of Foreign Commerce all supported the maintenance of the peg through 1994. See El Financiero (November 16, 1994), 28; La Jornada (August 31, 1994), 43; El Norte (April 3, 1993).
149. The National Industrial Chamber, the Confederation of Industrial Associations, and the National Council of Foreign Commerce all supported the maintenance of the peg through 1994. See El Financiero (November 16, 1994), 28; La Jornada (August 31, 1994), 43; El Norte (April 3, 1993).
150. Part of the government's justification for maintaining the peg was to avoid price increases on imported machinery and inputs. See El Financiero (November 25, 1991), 87. While exporting maquiladoras have long imported virtually all inputs, the domestic non-maquila sector also relied increasingly on intermediate goods from abroad. From 1989 to 1993, while Mexican non-maquila exports rose 31.9 percent, from $22.8 billion to $30 billion, non-maquila imports rose by an astonishing 109 percent, from $23.4 billion to $48.9 billion. See El Inversionista Mexicano (August 29, 1994).
151. Part of the government's justification for maintaining the peg was to avoid price increases on imported machinery and inputs. See El Financiero (November 25, 1991), 87. While exporting maquiladoras have long imported virtually all inputs, the domestic non-maquila sector also relied increasingly on intermediate goods from abroad. From 1989 to 1993, while Mexican non-maquila exports rose 31.9 percent, from $22.8 billion to $30 billion, non-maquila imports rose by an astonishing 109 percent, from $23.4
152. El Economista (April 14, 1994), 48.
153. See Chen Te'an, "Lessons from Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia," Beijing Review 40 (September 29, 1997); Brian Bremner and Joyce Barnathan, "Who's Really Pounding Asian Economies?" Business Week (September 22, 1997), 52; "Lessons for Thailand, et al." Economist (July 12, 1997), 16. For a more formal analysis of the regulatory causes of the Asian crash, see Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?" (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html).
154. See Chen Te'an, "Lessons from Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia," Beijing Review 40 (September 29, 1997); Brian Bremner and Joyce Barnathan, "Who's Really Pounding Asian Economies?" Business Week (September 22, 1997), 52; "Lessons for Thailand, et al." Economist (July 12, 1997), 16. For a more formal analysis of the regulatory causes of the Asian crash, see Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?" (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html).
155. See Chen Te'an, "Lessons from Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia," Beijing Review 40 (September 29, 1997); Brian Bremner and Joyce Barnathan, "Who's Really Pounding Asian Economies?" Business Week (September 22, 1997), 52; "Lessons for Thailand, et al." Economist (July 12, 1997), 16. For a more formal analysis of the regulatory causes of the Asian crash, see Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?" (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html).
156. See Chen Te'an, "Lessons from Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia," Beijing Review 40 (September 29, 1997); Brian Bremner and Joyce Barnathan, "Who's Really Pounding Asian Economies?" Business Week (September 22, 1997), 52; "Lessons for Thailand, et al." Economist (July 12, 1997), 16. For a more formal analysis of the regulatory causes of the Asian crash, see Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?" (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html).
157. On the role of cronyism and corruption, see Peter C. Newman, "Something Rotten in the State of Asia," Maclean's (December 29, 1997), 96; "Asia's Stockmarket Nightmare," Economist (December 20, 1997), 107; Steven Butler, "Living Dangerously," U.S. News & World Report (January 19, 1998), 55.
158. On the role of cronyism and corruption, see Peter C. Newman, "Something Rotten in the State of Asia," Maclean's (December 29, 1997), 96; "Asia's Stockmarket Nightmare," Economist (December 20, 1997), 107; Steven Butler, "Living Dangerously," U.S. News & World Report (January 19, 1998), 55.
159. On the role of cronyism and corruption, see Peter C. Newman, "Something Rotten in the State of Asia," Maclean's (December 29, 1997), 96; "Asia's Stockmarket Nightmare," Economist (December 20, 1997), 107; Steven Butler, "Living Dangerously," U.S. News & World Report (January 19, 1998), 55.