Decision Making in Political Systems Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 289-325

  Tsebelis, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976104285     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007225     Document Type: Article

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37. Quoted in Maor, ‘Intra-Party Conflict and Coalitional Behavior in Denmark and Norway’, p. 108.
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