A survey of timing channels and countermeasures

ACM Computing Surveys

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 2018, Pages

  Biswas, Arnab Kumar ^a   Ghosal, Dipak ^b   Nagaraja, Shishir ^c  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Covert timing channel communication; Network flow watermarking; Timing channel; Timing channel applications; Timing channel countermeasures; Timing side channel

Indexed keywords

CODES (SYMBOLS); COMPUTATION THEORY; TIMING CIRCUITS;

CHANNEL COMMUNICATION; COVERT TIMING CHANNEL COMMUNICATION; COVERT TIMING CHANNELS; NETWORK FLOW WATERMARKING; TIMING CHANNEL APPLICATION; TIMING CHANNEL COUNTERMEASURE; TIMING CHANNELS; TIMING SIDE CHANNELS;

SURVEYS;

EID: 85017127711     PISSN: 03600300     EISSN: 15577341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/3023872     Document Type: Review

References (185)

1. O. Aciiçmez. 2007. Yet another microarchitectural attack: Exploiting i-cache. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Computer Security Architecture (CSAW'07). ACM, New York, NY, 11-18.
2. O. Aciiçmez, B. Brumley, and P. Grabher. 2010. New results on instruction cache attacks. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES'10), Stefan Mangard and Franois-Xavier Standaert (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6225. Springer, Berlin, 110-124.
3. O. Aciiçmez, Ç. K. Koç, and J. Seifert. 2006. Predicting secret keys via branch prediction. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'07), Masayuki Abe (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4377. Springer, Berlin, 225-242.
4. O. Aciiçmez, Ç. K. Koç, and J. Seifert. 2007. On the power of simple branch prediction analysis. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS'07). ACM, New York, NY, 312-320.
5. O. Aciiçmez, W. Schindler, and Ç.K. Koç. 2005. Improving Brumley and Boneh timing attack on unprotected SSL implementations. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'05). ACM, New York, NY, 139-146.
6. O. Aciiçmez, W. Schindler, and Ç. K. Koç. 2007. Cache based remote timing attack on the AES. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'07), Masayuki Abe (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4377. Springer, Berlin, 271-286.
7. S. A. Ahmadzadeh and G. Agnew. 2013. Turbo covert channel: An iterative framework for covert communication over data networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications 2013 (IEEE INFOCOM 2013), 2031-2039.
8. K. Ahsan and D. Kundur. 2002. Practical data hiding in TCP/IP. In Proc. Workshop on Multimedia Security at ACM Multimedia.
9. H. Aly and M. ElGayyar. 2013. Attacking AES using bernsteins attack on modern processors. In Progress in Cryptology (AFRICACRYPT'13), Amr Youssef, Abderrahmane Nitaj, and AboulElla Hassanien (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7918. Springer, Berlin, 127-139.
10. V. Anantharam and S. Verdu. 1996. Bits through queues. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 42, 1 (Jan 1996), 4-18.
11. R. Archibald. 2013. Design and Detection of Covert Communication: Timing Channels and Application Tunneling. Ph.D. Dissertation. Davis, CA., USA.
12. R. Archibald and D. Ghosal. 2012. A covert timing channel based on fountain codes. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom'12). 970-977.
13. R. Archibald and D. Ghosal. 2014. A comparative analysis of detection metrics for covert timing channels. Computers & Security 45 (2014), 284-292.
14. A. Askarov, D. Zhang, and A. C. Myers. 2010. Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'10). ACM, New York, NY, 297-307.
15. R. Avanzi, S. Hoerder, D. Page, and M. Tunstall. 2011. Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and niederreiter public-key cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 1, 4 (2011), 271-281.
16. B. Brumley. 2011. Covert Timing Channels, Caching, and Cryptography. Ph.D. Dissertation. Espoo, Finland.
17. A. S. Bedekar and M. Azizoglu. 1998. The information-theoretic capacity of discrete-time queues. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 44, 2 (March 1998), 446-461.
18. D. E. Bell and L. J. L. Padula. 1976. Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and MULTICS Interpretation. Technical Report 522B. Deputy for Command and Management System, Hanscom Air Force Base, Bedford, MA.
19. D. J. Bernstein. 2005. Cache-Timing Attacks on AES. Technical Report. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 606077045.
20. A. K. Biswas. 2016. Source authentication techniques for network-on-chip router configuration packets. Journal of Emerging Technology in Computing Systems 13, 2, Article 28 (Nov. 2016), 31 pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2996194
21. J. Blomer, J. Guajardo, and V. Krummel. 2005. Provably secure masking of AES. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, Helena Handschuh and M. Anwar Hasan (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3357. Springer, Berlin, 69-83.
22. A. Bogdanov, T. Eisenbarth, C. Paar, and M. Wienecke. 2010. Differential cache-collision timing attacks on AES with applications to embedded CPUs. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'10), Josef Pieprzyk (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5985. Springer, Berlin, 235-251.
23. J. Bonneau and I. Mironov. 2006. Cache-collision timing attacks against AES. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES'06), Louis Goubin and Mitsuru Matsui (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4249. Springer, Berlin, 201-215.
24. B. Brumley and R. Hakala. 2009. Cache-timing template attacks. In Advances in Cryptology (ASIACRYPT'09), Mitsuru Matsui (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5912. Springer, Berlin, 667-684.
25. B. Brumley and N. Tuveri. 2011. Remote timing attacks are still practical. In Computer Security (ESORICS'11), Vijay Atluri and Claudia Diaz (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6879. Springer, Berlin, 355-371.
26. D. Brumley and D. Boneh. 2003. Remote timing attacks are practical. In Proceedings of the 12th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12 (SSYM'03). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1-1.
27. D. Brumley and D. Boneh. 2005. Remote timing attacks are practical. Computer Networks 48, 5 (2005), 701-716.
28. C. Christian. 2004. An information-theoretic model for steganography. Information and Computation 192, 1 (2004), 41-56.
29. S. Cabuk. 2006. Network Covert Channels: Design, Analysis, Detection, and Elimination. Ph.D. Dissertation. West Lafayette, IN.
30. S. Cabuk, C. E. Brodley, and C. Shields. 2009. IP covert channel detection. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 12, 4, Article 22 (April 2009), 29 pages.
31. R. C. Chakinala, A. Kumarasubramanian, R. Manokaran, G. Noubir, C. P. Rangan, and R. Sundaram. 2007. Steganographic communication in ordered channels. In Information Hiding, Jan L. Camenisch, Christian S. Collberg, Neil F. Johnson, and Phil Sallee (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4437. Springer, Berlin, 42-57.
32. C. Chen, M. Song, G. Hsieh, and C. Xin. 2011. A PLL based approach to building an effective covert timing channel. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM'11). 1-5.
33. C. Chen, T. Wang, Y. Kou, X. Chen, and X. Li. 2013b. Improvement of trace-driven i-cache timing attack on the {RSA} algorithm. Journal of Systems and Software 86, 1 (2013), 100-107.
34. C. Chen, T. Wang, and J. Tian. 2013a. Improving timing attack on RSA-CRT via error detection and correction strategy. Information Sciences 232 (2013), 464-474.
35. J. Chen and G. Venkataramani. 2014. An algorithm for detecting contention-based covert timing channels on shared hardware. In Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP'14). ACM, New York, NY, Article 1, 8 pages.
36. M. Ciet, M. Neve, E. Peeters, and J.-J. Quisquater. 2003. Parallel FPGA implementation of RSA with residue number systems - can side-channel threats be avoided? In Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE 46th Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, Vol. 2, 806-810.
37. W. Cilio, M. Linder, C. Porter, J. Di, S. Smith, and D. Thompson. 2010. Side-channel attack mitigation using dual-spacer dual-rail delay-insensitive logic (D3L). In Proceedings of the IEEE SoutheastCon 2010 (SoutheastCon'10). 471-474.
38. W. Cilio, M. Linder, C. Porter, J. Di, D. R. Thompson, and S. C. Smith. 2013. Mitigating power- and timing-based side-channel attacks using dual-spacer dual-rail delay-insensitive asynchronous logic. Microelectronics Journal 44, 3 (2013), 258-269.
39. T. P. Coleman and N. Kiyavash. 2008a. Practical codes for queueing channels: An algebraic, state-space, message-passing approach. In IEEE Information Theory Workshop, 2008 (ITW'08). 318-322.
40. T. P. Coleman and N. Kiyavash. 2008b. Sparse graph codes and practical decoding algorithms for communicating over packet timings in networks. In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, 2008 (CISS'08). 447-452.
41. S. A. Crosby, D. S. Wallach, and R. H. Riedi. 2009. Opportunities and limits of remote timing attacks. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 12, 3, Article 17 (Jan. 2009), 29 pages.
42. Department of Defense Standard. 1985. Trusted computer system evaluation criteria. Technical Report DOD 5200.28-STD (1985).
43. J. Dhem, F. Koeune, P. Leroux, P. Mestre, J. Quisquater, and J. Willems. 2000. A practical implementation of the timing attack. In Smart Card Research and Applications, Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Bruce Schneier (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1820. Springer, Berlin, 167-182.
44. R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. 2004. Tor: The second-generation onion router. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13 (SSYM'04). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1-17.
45. D. L. Donoho, A. G. Flesia, U. Shankar, V. Paxson, J. Coit, and S. Staniford. 2002. Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection: Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive Streams by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay. Springer, Berlin, 17-35.
46. B. P. Dunn, M. Bloch, and J. N. Laneman. 2009. Secure bits through queues. In Proceedings of the IEEE Information Theory Workshop on Networking and Information Theory, 2009 (ITW'09). 37-41.
47. J. J. Edwards, J. D. Brown, and P. C. Mason. 2012. Using covert timing channels for attack detection in MANETs. In Military Communications Conference, 2012 (MILCOM'12). 1-7.
48. A. El-Atawy and E. Al-Shaer. 2009. Building covert channels over the packet reordering phenomenon. In IEEE INFOCOM 2009. 2186-2194.
49. J. A. Elices and F. Perez-Gonzalez. 2013. The flow fingerprinting game. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS'13). 97-102.
50. I. Ezzeddine and P. Moulin. 2009. Achievable rates for queue-based timing stegocodes. In IEEE Information Theory Workshop, 2009 (ITW'09). 379-383.
51. S. Ghosh, D. Mukhopadhyay, and D. Roychowdhury. 2011. Petrel: Power and timing attack resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplier based on programmable GF(p) arithmetic unit. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers, 58, 8 (Aug. 2011), 1798-1812.
52. S. Ghosh and I. Verbauwhede. 2014. BLAKE-512-based 128-bit CCA2 secure timing attack resistant McEliece cryptoprocessor. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 63, 5 (May 2014), 1124-1133.
53. S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang. 2007. Detecting covert timing channels: An entropy-based approach. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'07). 307-316.
54. S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang. 2011. An entropy-based approach to detecting covert timing channels. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 8, 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2011), 785-797.
55. S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, D. Wijesekera, and S. Jajodia. 2008. Model-based covert timing channels: Automated modeling and evasion. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID'08). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 211-230.
56. J. Giles and B. Hajek. 2002. An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 48, 9 (Sep. 2002), 2455-2477.
57. C. G. Girling. 1987. Covert channels in LAN's. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 13, 2 (1987), 292-296.
58. S. Z. Goher, B. Javed, and N. A. Saqib. 2012. Covert channel detection: A survey based analysis. In Proceedings of the 2012 9th International Conference on High Capacity Optical Networks and Enabling Technologies (HONET'12). 057-065.
59. X. Gong and N. Kiyavash. 2013. Timing side channels for traffic analysis. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP'13). 8697-8701.
60. X. Gong, M. Rodrigues, and N. Kiyavash. 2012. Invisible flow watermarks for channels with dependent substitution and deletion errors. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP'12). 1773-1776.
61. X. Gong, M. Rodrigues, and N. Kiyavash. 2013. Invisible flow watermarks for channels with dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 8, 11 (Nov. 2013), 1850-1859.
62. T. Goodspeed. 2008. A side-channel timing attack of the MSP430 BSL. In Black Hat USA 2008.
63. S. K. Gorantla, S. Kadloor, T. P. Coleman, N. Kiyavash, I. S. Moskowitz, and M. H. Kang. 2010. Directed information and the NRL network pump. In Proceedings of the 2010 International Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications (ISITA'10). 343-348.
64. S. K. Gorantla, S. Kadloor, N. Kiyavash, T. P. Coleman, I. S. Moskowitz, and M. H. Kang. 2012. Characterizing the efficacy of the NRL network pump in mitigating covert timing channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7, 1 (Feb. 2012), 64-75.
65. S. Gueron. 2012. Intel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) New Instructions Set. Technical Report 323641-001, Revision 3.01. Intel Corporation, Intel Architecture Group, Israel Development Center.
66. A. Herzberg and H. Shulman. 2013. Limiting MitM to MitE covert-channels. In Proceedings of the 2013 8th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'13). 236-241.
67. A. Hevia and M. Kiwi. 1999. Strength of two data encryption standard implementations under timing attacks. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 2, 4 (Nov. 1999), 416-437.
68. A. Hodjat, D. D. Hwang, and I. Verbauwhede. 2005. A scalable and high performance elliptic curve processor with resistance to timing attacks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing, 2005 (ITCC'05), Vol. 1, 538-543.
69. A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov. 2011a. CoCo: Coding-based covert timing channels for network flows. In Information Hiding (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Toms Filler, Toms Pevn, Scott Craver, and Andrew D. Ker (Eds.), Vol. 6958. Springer, 314-328.
70. A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov. 2011b. SWIRL: A scalable watermark to detect correlated network flows. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. Internet Society.
71. A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov. 2011c. Towards improving network flow watermarks using the repeat-accumulate codes. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP'11). 1852-1855.
72. A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov. 2013a. BotMosaic: Collaborative network watermark for the detection of IRC-based botnets. Journal of Systems and Software 86, 3 (2013), 707-715.
73. A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov. 2013b. The need for flow fingerprints to link correlated network flows. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Emiliano De Cristofaro and Matthew Wright (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7981. Springer, Berlin, 205-224.
74. A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov. 2009a. Multi-flow attack resistant watermarks for network flows. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2009 (ICASSP'09). 1497-1500.
75. A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov. 2009b. RAINBOW: A robust and invisible non-blind watermark for network flows. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'09). The INTERNET Society.
76. A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov. 2014. Non-blind watermarking of network flows. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 22, 4 (Aug. 2014), 1232-1244.
77. W. M. Hu. 1991. Reducing timing channels with fuzzy time. In Proceedings of IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy. 8-20.
78. W. Hu, J. Oberg, A. Irturk, M. Tiwari, T. Sherwood, D. Mu, and R. Kastner. 2012. On the complexity of generating gate level information flow tracking logic. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7, 3 (June 2012), 1067-1080.
79. J. Huang, X. Pan, X. Fu, and J. Wang. 2011. Long PN code based DSSS watermarking. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2011. 2426-2434.
80. R. Hund, C. Willems, and T. Holz. 2013. Practical timing side channel attacks against kernel space ASLR. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP'13). 191-205.
81. J. Jaskolka, R. Khedri, and Q. Zhang. 2012. On the necessary conditions for covert channel existence: A state-of-the-art survey. Procedia Computer Science 10 (2012), 458-465.
82. W. Jia, F. P. Tso, Z. Ling, X. Fu, D. Xuan, and W. Yu. 2009. Blind detection of spread spectrum flow watermarks. In IEEE INFOCOM 2009. 2195-2203.
83. J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall. 1998. Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers. In Computer Security (ESORICS'98), Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Yves Deswarte, Catherine Meadows, and Dieter Gollmann (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1485. Springer, Berlin, 97-110.
84. R. Kemmerer. 1982. A practical approach to identifying storage and timing channels. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
85. R. A. Kemmerer. 1983. Shared resource matrix methodology: An approach to identifying storage and timing channels. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 1, 3 (Aug. 1983), 256-277.
86. R. A. Kemmerer. 2002. A practical approach to identifying storage and timing channels: Twenty years later. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. 109-118.
87. H. Khan, Y. Javed, F. Mirza, and S. A. Khayam. 2009. Embedding a covert channel in active network connections. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2009 (GLOBECOM'09). 1-6.
88. N. Kiyavash and T. Coleman. 2009. Covert timing channels codes for communication over interactive traffic. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2009 (ICASSP'09). 1485-1488.
89. N. Kiyavash, A. Houmansadr, and N. Borisov. 2008. Multi-flow attacks against network flow watermarking schemes. In 17th USENIX Security Symposium.
90. N. Kiyavash, F. Koushanfar, T. P. Coleman, and M. Rodrigues. 2013. A timing channel spyware for the CSMA/CA protocol. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 8, 3 (March 2013), 477-487.
91. P. C. Kocher. 1996. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO'96), Neal Koblitz (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1109. Springer, Berlin, 104-113.
92. F. Koeune and J. Quisquater. 1999. A Timing Attack Against Rijndael. Technical Report CG-1999/1. Universite catholique de Louvain, Departement d Electricite (DICE), Belgium.
93. J. Kong, O. Aciiçmez, J. Seifert, and H. Zhou. 2008. Deconstructing new cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Computer Security Architectures (CSAW'08). ACM, New York, NY, 25-34.
94. J. Kong, O. Aciicmez, J. P. Seifert, and H. Zhou. 2009. Hardware-software integrated approaches to defend against software cache-based side channel attacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE 15th International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, 2009 (HPCA'09). 393-404.
95. R. Konighofer. 2008. A fast and cache-timing resistant implementation of the AES. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'08), Tal Malkin (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4964. Springer, Berlin, 187-202.
96. K. Kothari and M. Wright. 2013. Mimic: An active covert channel that evades regularity-based detection. Computer Networks 57, 3 (2013), 647-657.
97. E. Ksper and P. Schwabe. 2009. Faster and timing-attack resistant AES-GCM. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES'09), Christophe Clavier and Kris Gaj (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5747. Springer, Berlin, 1-17.
98. B. W. Lampson. 1973. A note on the confinement problem. Communications of the ACM 16, 10 (Oct. 1973), 613-615.
99. K. S. Lee, H. Wang, and H. Weatherspoon. 2014. PHY covert channels: Can you see the idles? In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI'14). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 173-185.
100. Z. Lin and N. Hopper. 2012. New attacks on timing-based network flow watermarks. In Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (Security'12). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 20-20.
101. F. Liu and R. B. Lee. 2013. Security testing of a secure cache design. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP'13). ACM, New York, NY, Article 3, 8 pages.
102. G. Liu, J. Zhai, and Y. Dai. 2012. Network covert timing channel with distribution matching. Telecommunication Systems 49, 2 (2012), 199-205.
103. G. Liu, J. Zhai, Y. Dai, and Z. Wang. 2009. Covert timing channel with distribution matching. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security - Volume 01 (MINES'09). IEEE Computer Society, 565-568.
104. Y. Liu, F. Armknecht, D. Ghosal, S. Katzenbeisser, A. Sadeghi, and S. Schulz. 2009. Hide and seek in time - robust covert timing channels. In Proceedings of the 14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'09).
105. Y. Liu, D. Ghosal, F. Armknecht, A. R. Sadeghi, S. Schulz, and S. Katzenbeisser. 2010. Robust and undetectable steganographic timing channels for i.i.d. traffic. In Information Hiding, Rainer Bhme, Philip W. L. Fong, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6387. Springer, Berlin, 193-207.
106. J. Luo, X. Wang, and M. Yang. 2012b. An interval centroid based spread spectrum watermarking scheme for multi-flow traceback. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 35, 1 (2012), 60-71.
107. X. Luo, E. W. W. Chan, and R. K. C. Chang. 2007. Cloak: A ten-fold way for reliable covert communications. In Computer Security (ESORICS'07), Joachim Biskup and Javier Lpez (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4734. Springer, Berlin, 283-298.
108. X. Luo, E. Chan, and R. Chang. 2008. TCP covert timing channels: Design and detection. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks With FTCS and DCC, 2008 (DSN'08). 420-429.
109. X. Luo, E. W. W. Chan, P. Zhou, and R. K. C. Chang. 2012a. Robust network covert communications based on TCP and enumerative combinatorics. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 9, 6 (Nov 2012), 890-902.
110. X. Luo, J. Zhang, R. Perdisci, and W. Lee. 2010. On the secrecy of spread-spectrum flow watermarks. In Computer Security (ESORICS'10), Dimitris Gritzalis, Bart Preneel, and Marianthi Theoharidou (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6345. Springer, Berlin, 232-248.
111. X. Luo, P. Zhou, J. Zhang, R. Perdisci, W. Lee, and R. K. C. Chang. 2011. Exposing invisible timing-based traffic watermarks with BACKLIT. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'11). ACM, New York, NY, 197-206.
112. R. Martin, J. Demme, and S. Sethumadhavan. 2012. TimeWarp: Rethinking timekeeping and performance monitoring mechanisms to mitigate side-channel attacks. In Proceedings of the 2012 39th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA'12). 118-129.
113. B. C. Mason, D. Ghosal, and C. Corbett. 2010. Evaluation of a massively parallel architecture for network security applications. In Proceedings of the 2010 18th Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP'10). 85-91.
114. P. Momcilovic. 2006. Mismatch decoding of a compound timing channel. In 44th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing.
115. I. S. Moskowitz and A. R. Miller. 1992. The channel capacity of a certain noisy timing channel. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 38, 4 (1992), 1339-1344.
116. S. Mou, Z. Zhao, S. Jiang, Z. Wu, and J. Zhu. 2012. Feature extraction and classification algorithm for detecting complex covert timing channel. Computers and Security 31, 1 (2012), 70-82.
117. K. Mowery, S. Keelveedhi, and H. Shacham. 2012. Are AES x86 cache timing attacks still feasible? In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security Workshop (CCSW'12). ACM, New York, NY, 19-24.
118. J. Oberg, W. Hu, A. Irturk, M. Tiwari, T. Sherwood, and R. Kastner. 2010. Theoretical analysis of gate level information flow tracking. In Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference (DAC'10). ACM, New York, NY, 244-247.
119. J. Oberg, W. Hu, A. Irturk, M. Tiwari, T. Sherwood, and R. Kastner. 2011. Information flow isolation in I2C and USB. In Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference (DAC'11). ACM, New York, NY, 254-259.
120. D. Osvik, A. Shamir, and E. Tromer. 2006. Cache attacks and countermeasures: The case of AES. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'06), David Pointcheval (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3860. Springer, Berlin, 1-20.
121. Z. Pan, H. Peng, X. Long, C. Zhang, and Y. Wu. 2009. A watermarking-based host correlation detection scheme. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government, 2009 (ICMECG'09). 493-497.
122. P. Peng, P. Ning, and D. S. Reeves. 2006. On the secrecy of timing-based active watermarking trace-back techniques. In Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP'06). Washington, DC, 334-349.
123. P. Peng, P. Ning, D. S. Reeves, and X. Wang. 2005. Active timing-based correlation of perturbed traffic flows with chaff packets. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, 2005. 107-113.
124. C. Percival. 2005. Cache missing for fun and profit. In Proceedings of BSDCan 2005.
125. Y. J. Pyun, Y. Park, D. S. Reeves, X. Wang, and P. Ning. 2012. Interval-based flow watermarking for tracing interactive traffic. Computer Networks 56, 5 (2012), 1646-1665.
126. Y. J. Pyun, Y. H. Park, X. Wang, D. S. Reeves, and P. Ning. 2007. Tracing traffic through intermediate hosts that repacketize flows. In Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'07). IEEE. 634-642.
127. S. V. Radhakrishnan, A. S. Uluagac, and R. Beyah. 2013. Realizing an 802.11-based covert timing channel using off-the-shelf wireless cards. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM'13). 722-728.
128. C. Rebeiro, M. Mondal, and D. Mukhopadhyay. 2010. Pinpointing cache timing attacks on AES. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on VLSI Design, 2010 (VLSID'10). 306-311.
129. A. R. Sadeghi, S. Schulz, and V. Varadharajan. 2012. The silence of the LANs: Efficient leakage resilience for IPsec VPNs. In Computer Security (ESORICS'12), Sara Foresti, Moti Yung, and Fabio Martinelli (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7459. Springer, Berlin, 253-270.
130. E. Savaş. 2013. Attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms: Side-channel and fault attacks. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN'13). ACM, New York, NY, 7-14.
131. W. Schindler. 2000. A timing attack against RSA with the chinese remainder theorem. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES'00), ÇetinK Koç and Christof Paar (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1965. Springer, Berlin, 109-124.
132. W. Schindler. 2002. A combined timing and power attack. In Public Key Cryptography, David Naccache and Pascal Paillier (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2274. Springer, Berlin, 263-279.
133. S. H. Sellke, N. B. Shroff, S. Bagchi, C. 2006. Timing channel capacity for uniform and gaussian servers. In Proceedings of the 44th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing.
134. S. H. Sellke, C. Wang, S. Bagchi, and N. Shroff. 2009. TCP/IP timing channels: Theory to implementation. In Proceedings of the 28th Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'09). IEEE. 2204-2212.
135. S. H. Sellke, C. Wang, N. Shroff, and S. Bagchi. 2007. Capacity bounds on timing channels with bounded service times. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. 981-985.
136. A. Shoufan, F. Strenzke, H. G. Molter, and M. Stottinger. 2010. A timing attack against patterson algorithm in the McEliece PKC. In Information, Security and Cryptology (ICISC'09), Donghoon Lee and Seokhie Hong (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5984. Springer, Berlin, 161-175.
137. P. L. Shrestha, M. Hempel, M. Alahmad, and H. Sharif. 2013. Modeling packet rate covert timing channels. In Proceedings of the 2013 9th International Conference on Innovations in Information Technology (IIT'13). 54-59.
138. P. L. Shrestha, M. Hempel, H. Sharif, and H. H. Chen. 2016. An event-based unified system model to characterize and evaluate timing covert channels. IEEE Systems Journal 10, 1 (March 2016), 271-280.
139. G. J. Simmons. 1984. The prisoners problem and the subliminal channel. In Advances in Cryptology, David Chaum (Ed.). Springer US, 51-67.
140. D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian. 2001. Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH. In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium (SSYM'01). Berkeley, CA, 25-25.
141. R. M. Stillman. 2008. Detecting IP covert timing channels by correlating packet timing with memory content. In IEEE Southeastcon, 2008.IEEE. 204-209.
142. F. Strenzke. 2010. A timing attack against the secret permutation in the McEliece PKC. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, Nicolas Sendrier (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6061. Springer, Berlin, 95-107.
143. F. Strenzke, E. Tews, H. G. Molter, R. Overbeck, and A. Shoufan. 2008. Side channels in the McEliece PKC. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, Johannes Buchmann and Jintai Ding (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5299. Springer, Berlin, 216-229.
144. Y. Sun, X. Guan, T. Liu, and Y. Qu. 2012. An identity authentication mechanism based on timing covert channel. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom'12). 832-836.
145. R. Sundaresan and S. Verdu. 2000a. Robust decoding for timing channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 46, 2 (Mar 2000), 405-419.
146. R. Sundaresan and S. Verdu. 2000b. Sequential decoding for the exponential server timing channel. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 46, 2 (Mar 2000), 705-709.
147. R. Sundaresan and S. Verdu. 2006. Capacity of queues via point-process channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52, 6 (June 2006), 2697-2709.
148. J. A. Thomas. 1997. On the shannon capacity of discrete time queues. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. 333.
149. M. Tiwari, X. Li, H. M. G. Wassel, B. Mazloom, S. Mysore, F. T. Chong, and T. Sherwood. 2010. Gate-level information-flow tracking for secure architectures. IEEE Micro 30, 1 (Jan. 2010), 92-100.
150. M. Tiwari, J. K. Oberg, X. Li, J. Valamehr, T. Levin, B. Hardekopf, R. Kastner, F. T. Chong, and T. Sherwood. 2011. Crafting a usable microkernel, processor, and I/O system with strict and provable information flow security. In Proceedings of the 2011 38th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA'11) 189-199.
151. M. Tiwari, H. M. G. Wassel, B. Mazloom, S. Mysore, F. T. Chong, and T. Sherwood. 2009. Complete information flow tracking from the gates up. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS XIV). ACM, New York, NY, 109-120.
152. E. Tromer, D. A. Osvik, and A. Shamir. 2010. Efficient cache attacks on AES, and countermeasures. Journal of Cryptology 23, 2 (Jan. 2010), 37-71.
153. A. B. Wagner and V. Anantharam. 2005. Zero-rate reliability of the exponential-server timing channel. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 51, 2 (Feb. 2005), 447-465.
154. R. J. Walls, K. Kothari, and M. Wright. 2011. Liquid: A detection-resistant covert timing channel based on IPD shaping. Computer Networks 55, 6 (2011), 1217-1228.
155. C. D. Walter and S. Thompson. 2001. Distinguishing exponent digits by observing modular subtractions. In Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA'01), David Naccache (Ed.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2020. Springer, Berlin, 192-207.
156. X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia. 2005. Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'05). ACM, New York, NY, 81-91.
157. X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia. 2007. Network flow watermarking attack on low-latency anonymous communication systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2007 (SP'07). 116-130.
158. X. Wang, J. Luo, and M. Yang. 2009. An interval centroid based spread spectrum watermark for tracing multiple network flows. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2009 (SMC'09). 4000-4006.
159. X. Wang, J. Luo, and M. Yang. 2010. A double interval centroid-based watermark for network flow traceback. In Proceedings of the 2010 14th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design (CSCWD'10). 146-151.
160. X. Wang, J. Luo, and M. Yang. 2012. An efficient sequential watermark detection model for tracing network attack flows. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 16th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design (CSCWD'12). 236-243.
161. X. Wang and D. S. Reeves. 2003. Robust correlation of encrypted attack traffic through stepping stones by manipulation of interpacket delays. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'03). ACM, New York, NY, 20-29.
162. X. Wang and D. S. Reeves. 2011. Robust correlation of encrypted attack traffic through stepping stones by flow watermarking. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 8, 3 (May 2011), 434-449.
163. X. Wang, M. Yang, and J. Luo. 2013. A novel sequential watermark detection model for efficient traceback of secret network attack flows. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 36, 6 (2013), 1660-1670.
164. Y. Wang, P. Chen, Y. Ge, B. Mao, and L. Xie. 2009. Traffic controller: A practical approach to block network covert timing channel. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2009 (ARES'09). 349-354.
165. Y. Wang, A. Ferraiuolo, and G. E. Suh. 2014. Timing channel protection for a shared memory controller. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 20th International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA'14). 225-236.
166. Y. Wang and P. Moulin. 2008. Perfectly secure steganography: Capacity, error exponents, and code constructions. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 54, 6 (June 2008), 2706-2722.
167. Y. Wang and G. E. Suh. 2012. Efficient timing channel protection for on-chip networks. In Proceedings of the 2012 6th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Networks on Chip (NoCS'12). 142-151.
168. Z. Wang and R. B. Lee. 2006. Covert and side channels due to processor architecture. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2006 (ACSAC'06). 473-482.
169. Z. Wang and R. B. Lee. 2007. New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA'07). ACM, New York, NY, 494-505.
170. Z. Wang and R. B. Lee. 2008. A novel cache architecture with enhanced performance and security. In Proceedings of the 2008 41st IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture, 2008 (MICRO-41). 83-93.
171. H. M. G. Wassel, Y. Gao, J. K. Oberg, T. Huffmire, R. Kastner, F. T. Chong, and T. Sherwood. 2013. SurfNoC: A low latency and provably non-interfering approach to secure networks-on-chip. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA'13). ACM, New York, NY, 583-594.
172. J. C. Wray. 1991. An analysis of covert timing channels. In Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy. 2-7.
173. J. Wu, Y. Wang, L. Ding, and X. Liao. 2012. Improving performance of network covert timing channel through Huffman coding. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 55, 1-2 (2012), 69-79.
174. Z. Xinjie, W. Tao, M. Dong, Z. Yuanyuan, and L. Zhaoyang. 2008. Robust first two rounds access driven cache timing attack on AES. In Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering, Vol. 3. 785-788.
175. L. Yao, X. Zi, L. Pan, and J. Li. 2009. A study of on/off timing channel based on packet delay distribution. Computers & Security 28, 8 (Nov. 2009), 785-794. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.05.006.
176. W. Yu, X. Fu, S. Graham, D. Xuan, and W. Zhao. 2007. DSSS-based flow marking technique for invisible traceback. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2007 (SP'07). 18-32.
177. M. Yue, W. H. Robinson, L. Watkins, and C. Corbett. 2014. Constructing timing-based covert channels in mobile networks by adjusting CPU frequency. In Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP'14). ACM, New York, NY, Article 2, 8 pages.
178. S. Zander, G. Armitage, and P. Branch. 2007. A survey of covert channels and countermeasures in computer network protocols. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 9, 3 (2007), 44-57.
179. S. Zander, G. Armitage, and P. Branch. 2011. Stealthier inter-packet timing covert channels. In NETWORKING 2011, Jordi Domingo-Pascual, Pietro Manzoni, Sergio Palazzo, Ana Pont, and Caterina Scoglio (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6640. Springer, Berlin, 458-470.
180. L. Zhang, J. Luo, and M. Yang. 2009. An improved DSSS-based flow marking technique for anonymous communication traceback. In Proceedings of the Symposia and Workshops on Ubiquitous, Autonomic and Trusted Computing, 2009 (UIC-ATC'09). 563-567.
181. L. Zhang, Z. Wang, Q. Wang, and F. Miao. 2010b. MSAC and multi-flow attacks resistant spread spectrum watermarks for network flows. In Proceedings of the 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering (ICIFE'10), 438-441.
182. L. Zhang, Z. Wang, Y. Wang, and H. Liu. 2010a. Interval-based spread spectrum watermarks for tracing multiple network flows. In Proceedings of the 2010 12th IEEE International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT'10). 393-396.
183. Y. Zhang and V. Paxson. 2000. Detecting stepping stones. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9 (SSYM'00). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1-15.
184. X. Zi, L. Yao, X. Jiang, L. Pan, and J. Li. 2011. Evaluating the transmission rate of covert timing channels in a network. Computer Networks 55, 12 (2011), 2760-2771.
185. X. Zi, L. Yao, L. Pan, and J. Li. 2010. Implementing a passive network covert timing channel. Computers and Security 29, 6 (2010), 686-696.