Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 297-307

  Askarov, Aslan ^a   Zhang, Danfeng ^a   Myers, Andrew C ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Information flow; Mitigation; Timing channels

Indexed keywords

AMOUNT OF INFORMATION; BLACK BOXES; GENERAL CLASS; INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL; INFORMATION FLOWS; MITIGATION; OUTPUT EVENTS; TIMING ATTACKS; TIMING CHANNELS;

EID: 78650017523     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1866307.1866341     Document Type: Conference Paper

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