Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 122, Issue 3, 2016, Pages 431-455

  Gormley, Todd A ^a   Matsa, David A ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Agency conflicts; Managerial preferences; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 84999035202     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.08.002     Document Type: Article

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