Representations of moral violations: Category members and associated features

Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn 11, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 496-508

  Landy, Justin F ^a  

^a C74 Harper Center   (United States)

Author keywords

Individual differences; Moral foundations theory; Moral judgment; Social domain theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992111743     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19302975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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