Disconfirming Moral Foundations Theory on Its Own Terms: Reply to Graham (2015)

Social Psychological and Personality Science

Volumn 6, Issue 8, 2015, Pages 874-877

  Gray, Kurt ^a   Keeney, Jonathan E ^b  

^a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

ethics morality; justice; morality; social cognition; values

Indexed keywords

EID: 84943189678     PISSN: 19485506     EISSN: 19485514     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1948550615592243     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. C.D.CameronK.A.LindquistK.Gray (2015). A constructionist review of morality and emotions: No evidence for specific links between moral content and discrete emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Review. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1088868314566683
2. J.Graham (2015). Explaining away differences in moral judgment: Comment on Gray & Keeney (2015). Social Psychology and Personality Science, 6, 869–873.
3. J.GrahamJ.HaidtS.KolevaM.MotylR.IyerS.WojcikP.Ditto (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 55–130. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4
4. J.GrahamJ.HaidtB.A.Nosek (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1029–1046. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141
5. J.GrahamB.A.NosekJ.HaidtR.IyerS.KolevaP.H.Ditto (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 366–385. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847
6. K.GrayJ.E.Keeney (2015). Impure, or just weird? Scenarios sampling bias raises questions about the foundation of morality. Social Psychology and Personality Science, 6, 859–868.
7. K.GrayC.Schein (2012). Two minds vs. two philosophies: Mind perception defines morality and dissolves the debate between deontology and utilitarianism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 1–19. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0112-5
8. K.GrayC.ScheinA.F.Ward (2014). The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1600–1615. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1037/a0036149
9. K.GrayD.M.Wegner (2011). Dimensions of moral emotions. Emotion Review, 3, 227–229.
10. K.GrayL.YoungA.Waytz (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality.Psychological Inquiry, 23, 101–124. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387
11. J.Haidt (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.
12. J.Haidt (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
13. J.HaidtC.Joseph (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133, 55–66.
14. M.KuglerJ.T.JostS.Noorbaloochi (2014). Another look at moral foundations theory: Do authoritarianism and social dominance orientation explain liberal-conservative differences in “moral” intuitions?Social Justice Research, 27, 413–431.
15. R.E.NisbettT.D.Wilson (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259.
16. R.A.Shweder (2012). Relativism and universalism. In D.Fassin (Ed.), A companion to moral anthropology (pp. 85–102). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
17. L.YoungR.Saxe (2011). When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains. Cognition, 120, 202–214. Retrieved fromhttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005