Partner choice versus punishment in human Prisoner's Dilemmas

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2016, Pages 263-271

  Barclay, Pat ^a   Raihani, Nichola ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Partner choice; Partner control; Prisoner's Dilemma; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961795037     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004     Document Type: Article

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