Selective play: Choosing partners in an uncertain world

Personality and Social Psychology Review

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 276-289

  Hayashi, Nahoko ^a   Yamagishi, Toshio ^b  

^a JAPAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF SCIENCE   (Japan)

^b HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22444455503     PISSN: 10888683     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0204_4     Document Type: Article

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