Investigating the psychological world: Scientific method in the behavioral sciences

Investigating the Psychological World: Scientific Method in the Behavioral Sciences

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 1-198

  Haig, Brian D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84956759417     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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