Truth, science, and psychology

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 272-289

  Haig, Brian D ^a   Borsboom, Denny ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

correspondence truth; counterfactuals; justification; levels of theory; truthmakers

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861822768     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: 14617447     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354311430442     Document Type: Article

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