Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 139, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 441-458

  Ganson, Dorit ^a  

^a OBERLIN COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Degrees of belief; Epistemic constraints; Evidentialism; Justification; Pragmatic

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349084917     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9133-9     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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