The pursuit of epistemic good

Metaphilosophy

Volumn 34, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 29-47

  Percival, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief; Cognitive decision theory; Epistemic value; Intrinsic property; Knowledge; Reliabilism; State of mind; Virtue theoretic epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949220202     PISSN: 00261068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9973.00258     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Axtell, G. , editor. 2000. Knowledge, Belief and Character. Lanham, Md. : Rowman and Littlefield.
2. Dancy, J. 1995. "Supervenience, Virtues, and Consequences. " Philosophical Studies 78: 189-235.
3. Percival, P. 2002. "Epistemic Consequentialism I. " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supplementary volume) 76: 122-51.
4. Stalnaker, R. 2002. "Epistemic Consequentialism II. " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supplementary volume) 76: 153-68.
5. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. L. Zagzebski 2000. "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology. " In Knowledge, Belief and Character, edited by G. Axtell, 113-22. Lanham, Md. : Rowman and Littlefield.