Epistemic deflationism

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 103-134

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949281940     PISSN: 00384283     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00992.x     Document Type: Article

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