How can we know that we’re not brains in vats?

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 38, Issue S1, 2000, Pages 121-148

  DeRose, Keith ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845287983     PISSN: 00384283     EISSN: 20416962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00933.x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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