Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 431-445

  Trippas, Dries ^a   Pennycook, Gordon ^b   Verde, Michael F ^c   Handley, Simon J ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Analytic cognitive style; Belief bias; Cognitive ability; Individual differences; Motivated reasoning; Response bias; Signal detection theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940439336     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1016450     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. C.Bonner, & B.R.Newell, (2010) In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making. Memory & Cognition, 38, 186–196. doi:10.3758/MC.38.2.186
2. W.De Neys, & T.Glumicic, (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition, 106, 1248–1299. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002
3. C.Dube, C.M.Rotello, & E.Heit, (2010). Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: It's a response bias effect. Psychological Review, 117, 831–863. DOI:10.1037/a0019634
4. J.S.B.T.Evans, J. St. B. T., (2007). On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 321–339. doi:10.1080/13546780601008825
5. J.S.B.T.Evans, J. St. B. T., J.L.Barston, & P.Pollard, (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295–306.
6. J.S.B.T.Evans, J. St. B. T., S.J.Handley, & C.N.J.Harper, (2001). Necessity, possibility and belief: A study of syllogistic reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 935–958. doi:10.1080/02724980042000417
7. S.Frederick, (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42. doi:10.1257/089533005775196732
8. A.G.Greenwald, D.E.McGhee, & J.L.K.Schwartz, (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
9. E.Heit, & C.M.Rotello, (2014). Traditional difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed. Cognition, 131, 75–91. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.003
10. M.H.Huang, & R.M.Hauser, (1998). Trends in Black–White test score differentials: II. The WORDSUM vocabulary test. In U.Neisser (Ed.), The rising curve: Long-term gains in IQ and related measures (pp. 303–332). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
11. K.C.Klauer, J.Musch, & B.Naumer, (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 107, 852–884. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.4.852
12. G.S.Klein, (1951). A personal world through perception. In R.R.Blake, & G.V.Ramsey (Eds.), Perception: An approach to personality (pp. 328–355). New York, NY: The Ronald Press Company.
13. S.Lewandowsky, K.Oberauer, & G.E.Gignac, (2013). NASA faked the moon landing – therefore, (climate) science is a hoax: An anatomy of the motivated rejection of science. Psychological Science, 24, 622–633. doi:10.1177/0956797612457686
14. J.Oakhill, P.N.Johnson-Laird, & A.Garnham, (1989). Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition, 31, 117–140.
15. G.Pennycook, J.A.Cheyne, N.Barr, D.J.Koehler, & J.A.Fugelsang, (2013). Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection. Memory & Cognition, 42, 1–10. doi:10.3758/s13421-013-0340-7
16. G.Pennycook, J.A.Cheyne, N.Barr, D.J.Koehler, & J.A.Fugelsang, (2014a). The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 188–214. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000
17. G.Pennycook, J.A.Cheyne, P.Seli, D.J.Koehler, & J.A.Fugelsang, (2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief. Cognition, 123, 335–346. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003
18. G.Pennycook, D.Trippas, S.J.Handley, & V.A.Thompson, (2014b). Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 40, 544–554. doi:10.1037/a0034887
19. J.Raven, (2000). The Raven's progressive matrices: Change and stability over culture and time. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 1–48. doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0735
20. L.M.Schwartz, S.Woloshin, W.C.Black, & H.G.Welch, (1997). The role of numeracy in understanding the benefit of screening mammography. Annals of Internal Medicine, 127, 966–972.
21. H.Singmann, & D.Kellen, (2014). Concerns with the SDT approach to causal conditional reasoning: A comment on Trippas, Verde, Handley, Roser, McNair, & Evans (2014). Frontiers in Psychology, 5. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00402
22. K.E.Stanovich, & R.F.West, (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726.
23. R.J.Sternberg, & L.F.Zhang, (2001). Thinking styles across cultures: Their relationships with student learning. In R.J.Sternberg, & L.F.Zhang (Eds.), Perspectives on thinking, learning and cognitive styles (pp. 227–247). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
24. E.J.N.Stupple, L.J.Ball, J.S.B.T.Evans, J. St. B. T., & E.Kamal-Smith, (2011). When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 23, 931–941. doi:10.1080/20445911.2011.589381
25. V.A.Thompson, & S.C.Johnson, (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 215–244. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.869763
26. V.A.Thompson, N.J.Morley, & S.E.Newstead, (2011). Methodological and theoretical issues in belief-bias: Implications for dual process theories. In K.I.Manktelow, D.E.Over, & S.Elqayam (Eds.), The science of reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St. B. T Evans (pp. 309–338). Hove: Psychology Press.
27. V.A.Thompson, J.Prowse Turner, & G.Pennycook, (2011). Intuition, reason and metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 107–140. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001
28. M.E.Toplak, R.F.West, & K.E.Stanovich, (2011). The cognitive reflection test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory & Cognition, 39, 1275–1289. doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1
29. M.E.Toplak, R.F.West, & K.E.Stanovich, (2014). Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 147–168. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.844729
30. D.Trippas, S.J.Handley, & M.F.Verde, (2013). The SDT model of belief bias: Complexity, time and cognitive ability mediate the effects of believability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 1393–1402. doi:10.1037/a0032398
31. D.Trippas, S.J.Handley, & M.F.Verde, (2014a). Fluency and belief bias in deductive reasoning: New indices for old effects. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 631. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00631
32. D.Trippas, M.F.Verde, & S.J.Handley, (2014b). Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Cognition, 133, 586–600. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.009
33. D.Trippas, M.F.Verde, & S.J.Handley, (2015). Alleviating the concerns with the SDT approach to reasoning: Reply to Singmann & Kellen (2014). Frontiers in Psychology, 6. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00184
34. D.Trippas, M.F.Verde, S.J.Handley, M.Roser, N.McNair, & J.S.B.T.Evans, (2014c). Modeling causal conditional reasoning data using SDT: Caveats and new insights. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 217. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00217