Modeling causal conditional reasoning data using SDT: Caveats and new insights

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue MAR, 2014, Pages

  Trippas, Dries ^a   Verde, Michael F ^a   Handley, Simon J ^a   Roser, Matthew E ^a   McNair, Nicolas A ^a   Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief bias; Causal conditionals; Normative models; Reasoning; Signal detection theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897933554     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00217     Document Type: Article

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