Matching firms, managers, and incentives

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 623-681

  Bandiera, Oriana ^a   Guiso, Luigi ^b   Prat, Andrea ^c   Sadun, Raffaella ^d  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b EIEF ^*  (Italy)

^c Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^d HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84934758782     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/679672     Document Type: Article

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