Managerial leverage is limited by the extent of the market: Hierarchies, specialization, and the utilization of lawyers' human capital

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-43

  Garicano, Luis ^a,c   Hubbard, Thomas N ^b,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Centre for Economic Policy Research

^d NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249933401     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/508313     Document Type: Review

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