TMT pay dispersion and firm performance: The moderating role of organizational governance effectiveness

Journal of Management and Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 436-459

  Sanchez Marin, Gregorio ^a   Baixauli Soler, J Samuel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MURCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

compensation dispersion; firm performance; governance effectiveness; top management team; tournament theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84932195793     PISSN: 18333672     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/jmo.2014.87     Document Type: Article

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