Nonmarket interactions

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume 1

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 339-370

  Glaeser, Edward ^a   Scheinkman, José A ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927978524     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.012     Document Type: Chapter

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