Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 449-463

  Annen, Kurt ^a,b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Development; Networks; Self enforcing contracts; Social capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037374894     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00035-5     Document Type: Article

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